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Thispaper examines 36,640 labor contractssignedbetween whalemen and the agents who
organized 1.258 whaling voyages that departed from New BedfoS, Massachusetts between January
1, 1840 and December 31. 1858 and between January 1 and December 31, 1866. The contracts
contain information on the whalernan's station (occupation) and on his lay (the fraction of output of
the voyage that he was entitled to receive upon completion). The paper investigates the benefits
associated with this unique contract, examines the occupational and spatial distribution of lays, and
compares wages in whaling with those available in the merchant marine and those earned in shorn
based pursuits. It also attempts to assess the efficiency of this early labor market and to explore the
relationship between the labor contract, crew quality, technical change, andproductivity.
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Many Americans have read Moby Dick and could, if called upon, identify "Call me
Ishmael" as the opening sentence of that novel. Fewer have read Elmo }fohman's "Wages. Risk
and Pmfits in the Whaling Industry;" an even smaller number remember his opening words: "The
method of payment in the whaling industry was a singular one." It is, however, to the spirit of
Hohman rather than Melville that this paper is dedicated.
As Hohman has pointed out, a whaleman, were he a captain or a greenhand, was "not paid
by the day, week, or month, nor was he allowed a certain sum for every barrel of oil or every pound
of bone captured. Instead, his earnings consisted of a specified fractional share, known as the lay,
of the total net pmceeds of a voyage.... The earnings of a whaleman thus constituted a reward not
only for the performance of labor under peculiarly trying conditions, but also for the assumption of
both business and physical risks. For the size of his lay, representing his wages, was directly
dependent upon the business risks centering about price fluctuations, as well as upon the physical
risks of storm, fire, stranding, and poor luck on the whaling grounds."2 The effect of risks on the
earnings of whalemen is illustrated by the experience of the captains who directed the vessels that
sailed from New Bedford between New Year's day 1840 and the end of 1858. The monthly
earnings of the men who guided the more than 1200 successful voyages (voyages 1mm which a
vessel returned with some product) avenged $95.54, but their rewards ranged from a low of $1.20
to a high of $621.39. If the experience of the 146 captains whose vessels either returned clean or
not at all were included in the calculations, both the avenge and minimum values would be lower
still.
Hohman wrote more than fifty years ago. Although his work was based on an examinationof the records of a large number of whalingvoyages, it is not clear which voyages were included
nor how he analyzed the data that he found in the accounts of thosevoyages. On these questions,
Hohman merely reports: "The detailed figures serving as a warrant for thesestatements were
secured through an analysis of hundreds of individual accounts found in thecollection of scores of
original manuscript whaling account-books now in the New Bedford Library."3
In part this article parallels Hohman's; but it expands his work insome new directions; it
modifies some of his findings; and it directly disputes others. Thecorn of the study is based on a
systematic examination of 36,640 labor contracts drawn between ships' agents and the whalemen
who signed on to 1258 vessels that sailed fmm New Bedford betweenJanuary 1. 1840 and
December 30, 1858 and between January 1 and December30 of 1866 (seeAppendix Table I). The
1258 represent three-quarters of the voyages that, according to AlexanderStarbuck, departed New
Bedford during the years in question .Thelabor data have been linked with information on the
voyages themselves --informationdrawn chiefly from Starbuck, Hegarty, and Dias --andthe links
permit the labor contracts to be examined in light of the vessels and equipment used, thegrounds
hunted, and the results of the hunt.5 These records have been supplementedby account books of
whaling voyages and agents' letter books that axe on deposit at the Baker Library of Harvard
University.
In the 19th century sperm whales were hunted forsperm oil and spermaceti --theformer
used for high quality lighting and to lubricate fast-moving machinery, the latter forvery high-
quality candles. Baleen whales (the rights, humpbacks, grays, and bowheads), were valued for both
their oil and their bone. Whale oil was a less expensive (and lowerquality) illuminant than sperm
oil. It was also used as a lubricant for heavy machinery. Whale bone (orbaleen) was made into
corset stays, buggy whips, window shades and other products that demanded bothstrength and
flexibility.
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Although at one timeoranother during the nineteenthcentury British.Australian,and
Norwegian vesselsconstituteda notinsignificant share ofthe world's whaling fleet, theAmerican
componentwas the largest by far --between1820 and1880. itaccounted for more than sevçnty-
five percent of the total vessels.' Of the coastal cities that served as home for the American fleet
(them were twenty-two such cities in 1850), New Bedford was the most important. Between 1840
and 1860 its vesselsaccountedfor just less than fifty percent of all American whaling tonnage and
an equal fraction of the nation's total catch.
The fleets of some American ports specialized in sperm or in baleen whales or focused their
search in some particular geographic area, but the vessels that sailed from New Bedford were much
more catholic --theyaccounted for almost sixty percent of all sperm oil and mom than forty
percent of all whale oil returned by the American fleet --andthey hunted throughout the world.
New Bedford ships' logs list visits to fifty-five separate hunting gmunds, including such exotic and
geographically disparate places as Patagonia, Delago Bay, the OkhOLSk Sea, Desolation Island, and
Altaho. For purposes of this study, however, the fifty-five have been aggregated into just four
grounds: The Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Western Arctic.
In the 1840's and '50's, the New Bedford component, like the entire American fleet, was
heavily weighted toward ships; but it contained a substantial and growing proportion of barks and a
few brigs, sloops, and schooners as well (of the 1258 voyages, 854 were made by ships, 393 by
baits, but only eleven by brigs, sloops and schooners combined). Both ships and barks were three
masted. The former were square rigged; the latter, square rigged on the fore and main masts, and
fore-and-aft rigged on the mizzen. Ships were usually, but not always, larger than barks (the
avenge tonnage of the ships was 354 and of the barks, 277). Although on average barks employed
fewer workers, they used about one-sixth more labor per ton than ships.7
The twenty-nine men who manned a typical ship and the twenty-six that constituted a
bark's crew were organized very similarly. What differences there were appear to have reflected4
size of vessel, the date of sailing, the projectedlength of the voyage, and the vessel's destination,
rather than any difference in rigging. Each vessel had: (1)a captain and some number of mates --
alwaysone, usually three, but sometimes as many as five; (2) a set of skilled professional mariners
--theirranks always included between two and six boatsteerers, sometimesa shipkeeper, and
occasionally, a navigator or a head-a-boat; (3) a number of artisans --almostalways a cooper and a
carpenter, often a blacksmith, and occasionally a boat builder, a painter, a sail maker, a mechanic,a
machinist, a caulker, a coppersmith, and, on rare occasions, asurgeon, or a doctor, (4) some service
personnel --almostno vessel sailed without a cook and a steward, and these two were sometimes
supplemented by a second cook or steward, a steerage steward, or a steerage master, (5) a number
of seamen --someskified, some semiskilled, some "greenhands"; and (6) often a boy or two. Table
I pmvides a fairly accurate picture of the occupational structure of thecrew of a typical vessel. It
does not, however, capture the changes in the structure that occurred over the two anda half
decades in question.
2. The Whaleman's Lay
As Hohman has pointed out, each member of the crew from the captain to the cabinboy
received a predetermined fraction of his vessel's net catch. Even in this day of sophisticated
businessmen-actors and their high powered lawyers, the experience of the motion picture and
television industries has shown that there is many a slip betweengross and net That is, it is easy to
cheat on expenses; therefore, it is preferable to draw contracts that dependupon a percentage of the
final income in gross rather than net terms. Even today, however, as a reading ofVariety or the Los
AngelesTimes makes apparent, famous actors, including those who employ high pricedlegal talent,
still sign net contracts. In 19th century New Bedford, the whalemen, if not theagents and captains,
were no more sophisticated, and the lay was calculated on the "net" value of the catch.8 In the
whaling case, the difference between gross and net was a standard set of charges incurred during5
the voyage. The nature (but not the amount) of these charges wasspecifiedin advance, and the
labor contract was written to guarantee that the whaleman (along with the agentand owner) bore
his share. The charges always included payments for piotage, gauging, wharting, cooperage,
watching, cleaning, loading, and unloading. Toward mid-century. when the industry's
organizational structure became more complex, the list was expanded to includecommissions and
insurance on oil and bone shipped home during the course of the voyage.
The contract, however, does not appear to have presented the problems that have plagued
the entertainment industry. The expenditures were all made by the captain, and the value of his lay
depended on the size of the net Moreover, his behavior was monitored on the spot bythe other
ship's officers whose income also depended inversely on the size of the charges, and, at adistance.
by the agent, who had the same incentive.
Crew members were usually paid in cash or in a bill of exchange that could be converted to
cash, but the agent could, if he chose, give them their share in kind. A crewman was entitled to a
full share if he returned on the ship on which he sailed and a prorated share (based on the catch to
date) if he died or was discharged for illness or other good cause. Until the 1860's. however, he
was not legally entitled to any itnumeration if he deserted before the voyage was completed.
It is difficult to determine the effect of the agent's right to pay in kind. Hohman suggests
two reasons for the apparent frequent use of such payments when a crewman was discharged for
"good reason" during the voyage. Fiit, since there was often a lack of current information about
the price of whale products. agreement about the correct level of remuneration was difficult to
achieve. Second, in cases where the payment was substantial, the captain often wished to preserve
his limited cash reserves. The accounts of the ship Canton,forexample, show that over the course
of eight mid-century years a number of whalemen were paid off with amounts of oil that ranged
from 74 to 393 gallons.96
At the end of the voyage, however, payment in kind was usually invokedonly if there was
a dispute between crewmen and an agent over the value of the catch. While it was rarely
mentioned either in contemporary accounts or in the whaling literature, a letter from theagent and
ship owner Charles Morgan to his Boston lawyer suggests that it may have been a more common
practice than a reading of the standard literature would lead one to believe.
"...the universal custom is for the owner to make up the voyage at a certain price after
which it is optional with him to take it, or deliver to the crew as theymay elect and it is
always the right of the crew to demand the oil but they cannot demand money if the owner
is unwilling to pay it. The Condor's cargo has in part remained on the wharf & in store
since its arrival & I have never yet settled with all concerned. I have this day been
delivering to the Capt and one boatsteerer their parts or share of the oil and coffee as we
never could agree upon a price & I have after several week delay declined purchasing
much of the oil of another crew arrived since the Condor and many of them have taken
away their oil & some have yet left it on the wharf....
P.S. You will understand that voyages are always made up at a certain price whether the
crew intends to purchase their shares or not. They [the agentsj often decline purchasing &
on the other hand the crew often declines selling."1o
Whatever the importance of the right to pay in kind, all the evidence indicates that the rules
governing the earnings of men who failed to complete a voyage became steadily more important as
the duration of voyages lengthened --firstas the fleet moved to more distant grounds and then as
the captains and agents found that they could keep their vessels at sea for much longer periods, if
they used Pacific cities (Honolulu, Lahaina, and Panama, to cite three) as transshipment points.
Between 1840-41 and 1857-58, average voyage length increased from thirty-four to forty-five
months. In the Atlantic the length of an average voyage rose from twenty-two to thirty-six months,
in the Indian Ocean the increase was from twenty-nine to forty, and in the Pacific it went from
thirty-eight to forty-seven. Among the 1258 voyages, there were six that lasted more than five
years, and two vessels did not return until sixty- nine months after their departure from New
Bedford)1
The evidence indicates that there was a high and increasing level of labor turnover in a
typical crew. The George Howland, for example, a New Bedford ship that normally carried a crew7
of twenty-eight to thirty men, sailed six times between 1840 and 1866.Over the six voyages, the
number-of whalemen who died, were discharged, or deserted, ranged from twelve to twenty-four,
averaging sixty-three percent of the original crew.'2
As Hohman has pointed out, the form of the labor contract was idiosyncratic.Each
crewman negotiated a lay-- the fraction of the net proceeds realized fromthe sale of the catch that
he would receive at the end of the voyage.'3 The flavor of those negotiations is capturedin a letter
from Charles Morgan to his captain. Thomas A. Norton, discussing the staffing of the ship Hector.
After first spelling out the range of lays that he was "accustomed to give in a four boat ship" (3rd
Mate 1170 to 1/75, Boatsteerers 1/90 to 1/95, Seamen 1/125 to 11130, ordinary seamen 1/135 to
1/150, green hands 1/150 to 1/180,boysgreen 1/185 to 1/2(X), and boys not green 1/150 to 1/175)
he continues, "Mr Mayhew (a third mate) had a 1/65 last voyage but that was higher than I have
before given. I think 1110 a fair lay for Mr. Wimfrenn but would give 1/67 rather than not have
him
According to Hohman,, the officers, the cooper, and the boatsteerers received so-called
"short lays" --laysless than 1/100. While this conclusion is, in general, correct, there is a record of
one boatsteerer on the Sappho who, on an 1866 voyage, received only 1/150, and there were a
number whose lays fell between 1/125 and 1/140. Moreover, there are numerous examples of
shipkeepers, cooks, stewards, and even a few (twenty-nine) able (to say nothing of eleven ordinary)
seamen who received lays "shorter" than the magic 100. An examination of the conwacts in
question indicates that the "outliers" fall into two quite different categories. First, most seem to
stem from the perceived a ante competence of the individual whaleman --thatis, in the agent's
and the whaleman's recognition that there were substantial differences between the potential
productivity of whalemen, differences that existed even among seamen applying for the same job.
In the case of the "undexpaid" boatsteerers, each of the twelve who received lays longer than 120
was a crewmen on a vessel whose agent had signed his peers at wages in the "usual" range. The8
three other boatsteerers on the Sappho,forexample, received lays of 75,75, and100 respectively.
The "well paid" seamen on vessels hunting in the Indian, Pacific, and Arcticgrounds were often
characterized as "able" or "extra skilled", and theirnot-so-designated shipmates received lays more
closely in line with tradition. Since vessels seldom had more than a single steward, such intravessel
comparisons are difficult. It is, however, true that the stewards on vessels hunting the three distant
grounds who received abnormally short lays tended to have signed on vessels that werelarger (in
tonnage) and more heavily crewed than the average vessel of the same rig working those oceans. It
seems likely that the larger vessels demanded stewards with higher skills, and that thepotentially
highly skilled applicants were rewarded.
Skill differences do not, however, explain all of the outliers. Small vesselsmaking
relatively short cruises in the Atlantic tended to pay all their hands morn (that is to give shorter
lays) than those same crewmen would have demanded had they signed on larger vessels for longer
voyages to the more distant grounds. The voyages by the one ship, eight barks, and ten brigs.
sloops, and schooners, some of whose cooks, stewards, and skilled and semi-skified seamen
received "short" (less than 100) lays, accounted for only four percent of the ships and twelve
percent of the barks but seventy-seven percent of the smaller vessels that hunted the Atlantic.
Moreover, in each case the vessels were, on avenge, smaller and at sea for shorter periods of time
than their peers hunting the same ground. Overall, while there is a significantpositive relationship
between the total labor share and vessel size for vessels hunting in the three distantgrounds, the
relationship is negative and significant for those operating in the Atlantic.'5
Hohman goes on to argue, "the able and ordinary seamen, stewards, cooks, and blacksmiths
were entitled to shares which varied from 1/100 to 1/160; the green hands and boys had to be
content with long lays which fluctuated from 1/160 to 1/200; while instances of fractions as small
as 1/200 to 1/250 were occasionally encountered."6 Again Hohman's conclusions are generally,
but not exactly, correct, The cases of the well paid stewards, cooks, andseamen have already been9
noted, but there were many ordinaiy seamen and blacksmiths, to say nothing of carpenters, whose
earnings fell into the "long lay" range. In addition there are contracts for boys that called for
payments as low as 1/3500,onethat worked out to be 1/8500, several who signed on for "clothes"
and one boy who received no lay whatever (he signed on for "food").
In terms of the trend in the lays, Hohman argues that, with the exception of the shares of
captains and first and second mates, the lays were becoming longer as time passed. "That is, the
wage bargain entitled him [the whaleman], as time went on, to a smaller fractional shalt of the
voyages on which he shipped..."7 This degradation he attributes to three factors: (1) the gradually
deteriorating character and efficiency of the crew, (2) the increasing temptation to exploit the
inferior crews, and (3) the substitution of capital for labor.'8
As far as the time period covered by this study is concerned, Hohman's generalizations
concerning trends in lays are only partly correct. In addition, Hohman's estimates capture both the
time trend and the effect of shifts in the grounds hunted; given the nature of his sources, he is
unable to recognize, let alone disentangle, the two.
Table 2 displays avenge lays by ground for the twelve occupations for which there are
sufficient numbers of contracts to provide a basis for an annual ground-by-ground comparisons.
Table 3 provides all ground avenges for an additional seven occupations that appeared too
infrequently to permit a more detailed breakdown. Both sets of averages include only those
whalemen who had a single occupation. The All Grounds estimates include the sixty-one
miscellaneous voyages --voyagesthat Hohman may have included in his analysis, on which the
captains hunted so widely that they could not be assigned to any single ground. The All Grounds
avenges axe not, then, the avenges of the four enumerated grounds.
Between 1840 and 1866 some lays rose and others fell. As a result, while the all year
avenges in Table 4 do provide an accurate picture of the avenge shares earned by officers, artisans,10
cooks, and deck hands across the entire period, they do not describe the earnings hierarchy either at
the beginning or end of the period. If the standard is unskilled seamen, captains didveiy well, first
mates quite well, and the other officers not badly (captains earned more than twelve times, first
mates almost eight times, and the second, third, and fourth mates from two and a half to five limes
as much as a typical greenhand).'9 Among the skified maritime professionals, boatsteernrs earned
about twice as much and the "others" about two-thirds again as much as an unskilledcrewman.
Artisans, coopers aside, did not fare so well. Bane! makers earned more than three times as much
as an unskilled hand (about as much as a third mate), but a carpenter's margin was a bare thirteen
percent, and blacksmiths and the other skilled workers received only slightly more than half that
differential. Cooks and stewards did somewhat better, they earned about a third morn than their
shipmates who had never been to sea?° Finally, a skilled seamen could claim a premium of about
twenty-five percent over a greenhand, but his semi-skilled confrere was entitled to only about half
that bounty.
Much of Hohman's discussion is focused not on relative lays but on their redistribution--
and particularly the lengthening of all but those of the captains and mates.21 Starting at thetop of
the income hierarchy, the data show a continuous shortening (that is, increases) of officers'lays
from 1840 to at least 1857. Between 1840-43 and 1855-58, captains' lays shortenedby seventeen
percent, first mates' by twenty-four, second mates' by twenty-two, third mates' by nineteen and
fourth mates' by twelve.
In the case of skilled workers, the picture is less clear. On the one hand, forcoopers,
shipkeepers, and boatsteerers, comparisons of the years 1840-43 with 1855 --58 show small (eight,
four, and one percent) shortenings; a similar exercise suggests no significant change in a steward's
share. On the other hand, comparisons for cooks, carpenters, blacksmiths, and miscellaneous
artisans indicate a lengthening of three, fourteen, seventeen, and fourteenpercent. For seamen,
Holiman is unambiguously correct. The lays of skified seamen lengthened by fifteenpercent and11
semi-skilled and unskilled seamen by nine.
Given the materials with which he worked, Hobman was unable to distinguish ground- to-
ground differences in lays. In fact, them were significant and systematic differentials --
differentialsthat did not erode over time and that were responsible for a significant fraction of the
lengthening that Hohman observed. Table 5 captures the general outline of these differentials. The
late entry into the Arctic somewhat distorts the pattern for officers, but when the focus is narrowed
to the years after 1849, the entire pattern is very clear (see Table 6). Lays were shortest in the
Atlantic, they were about eight percent longer in the Indian Ocean, and they were about twelve
percent above the eastern baseline in the Pacific and Arctic grounds. Moreover, the differentials
persisted throughout the period, despite the longer voyages to the western grounds and the greater
loss rates experienced by barks in the Pacific and by all vessels in the Arctic. The explanation of
these persistent inter ground differentials is far from obvious, but an attempt is made to provide one
in section 4, below. Here, however, the issue is limited to the effects of the observed differentials
on the trends in lays that were captured in Hobman's analysis. Because of those differentials, a part
of the lengthening in the avenge seamen's lay can be traced to the redistribution of the fleet from
the short lay Atlantic and Indian grounds to the long lay Pacific and Arctic ones. Between 1840
and 1843 ten percent of the labor contracts were for voyages to the Atlantic and an additional
twenty-nine percent for vessels sailing to the Indian Ocean. By the years 1855 to 1858, however,
the Atlantic's share had declined to five and the Indian's to ten percent of the total. Thus, between
1840 and 1858 about one-fifth of the observed change in the average lay of a skified seamen can be
attributed to the geographic redistribution. In view of that redistribution, the shortening in officers'
lays is truly remarkable.
3. The Wages of Whalemen
The lay was only a means to an end: the real wage. The whaleman's interest centered on12
the dollars that the lay commanded. Anyattempt to estimate the whaleman's wage, however, raises
two sets of problems --neither trivial. First, although the maincomponent of a whaleman's
compensation package came from the sale of his share of the catch, the value of the lay was not
usually identical to his total income. There were both charges and supplements. Thereare also
significant issues raised by questions of the timing of the payment and of income in kind. Second,
even if adjusunents can be made to compensate for these aspects of thewage bargain, there are
questions of the appropriate definition of the wage.
In terms of the charges traditionally levied against the crewman'saccount, aside from the
repayment of cash and clothing advanced before and during the voyage and a small charge for the
Doctor's Box, crewmen's wages, as previously noted, were routinely docked for their share of
certain expenses incurred by the vessel during thevoyage. In the decades before mid-century the
standani charges were small. Hohman to the contrary notwithstanding, they did notsignificantly
affect the thai settlement For example, on ninevoyages made by four vessels between 1827 and
1850, these standard charges reduced an avenge crewman's finalpayment by a less than six-tenths
of one percent?
By the 1850's, however, the industry's structure had become more complex. Destinations
were farther from New Bedford, and the time lost reaching and returning from those morn distant
grounds was costly. In an attempt to overcome their vessels' capacity constraints and to use their
capital more efficiently, agents began to order their captains to transship a part of the catchthrough
ports like Lahaina and, if their vessel was not full when it began the homeward trek, toattempt to
purchase or to agree to transport enough cargo to fill the hold on the returnvoyage. Transshipments
involved commissions and freight charges and the crew was required to bear their share(they were,
however, credited with the interest earned on the income generated by the sale of thetransshipped
products from the date of their sale to the time of the vessel's return). Similarly, the oil and bone
purchased to top off the cargo was not costless, but it produced a net gain for both owner and crew.13
Because of these institutional changes, by the 1850's the charges against the gross revenues had
increased. On four voyages returning after that date, for example, the average crewman's earnings
were reduced by about three percent."
Later, during the Civil War, the threat of Confederate raiders drove insurance and freight
charges to new heights. On a voyage of the George Howlandthatdeparted New Bedford in 1862
and returned four years later, the charges totaled $28,316 (including $13,263 for freight, $9,143 for
insurance, and $5,032 in commissions), or more than fifteen percent of gross revenues. It should.
pethaps. be noted that, from the point of view of both the agent and the crew, the wartime voyage
was still a financial success. Despite the record charges, the monthly net revenues (in constant
dollars)were morethan half again as high as the average earned on the ship's previous seven
voyages and almost ten percent greater than on the most successful of the seven?4 Not all vessels
that put to sea during the War were faced by such heavy charges. On the bark Ca/lao's 1093 day
voyage from September 1862 to August 1865, for example, after adjustments for the interest
accrued on transhipped products, the net charges amounted to only about 1.6 percent of revenues.
After the War charges appear to have settled back into the range that had characterized the
1850's. On one voyage of the bark Ca/lao and four of the ship Milton, such offsets against wages
averaged 4.4 percent. They rose significantly above that level only when a misadventure near the
end of a voyage forced the owners to pay freight charges on cargo that would otherwise have been
brought back by the vessel itself. In the case of the Cailao-- condemnedin Mauritius in 1877--
the charges totaled 28.6 percent; in the case of the Milton-- "arrived Panama in distress" in 1889--
they amounted to 12.9 percent. In the latter case, however, if the Panama freight charges had not
been incurred, the total would have been only 5.1 percent?
In partial offset to these charges, some whalemen earned supplements to their contracted
lays. Captains, of course, usually received some fraction of the profits from the sales of clothing
and tobacco from the slop chest, sometimes a share of the slush, and they often canied on14
subsidiary commercial enterprises on their own account .Similarly,the cook was normally
entitled to some fraction of the slush fund. In addition, although there arequestions as to the
importance of the practice, seamen did, from time to time, receive not insubstantial bonuses for
particularly good performances in sighting and catching whales." On the 1834 voyage of the
George Howland, for example, four seamen received cash bonuses ranging from $30 to $50 --sums
equal to between 7.5 and 12.5 percent of their lay income? Also, a crew member might be the
recipient of some of the traditional charges that provided the wedge between gross and net value. A
seamen might well add $25 to $100 to his earnings by helping load the vessel before it set to sea, by
helping unload or clean the vessel when it returned to port, or by foregoing shore leave on some
exotic South Sea island to remain aboard ship as a watchman.
Finally, although it is impossible to assess the importance of the practice, the evidence
indicates that lays were sometimes renegotiated during the voyage. In 1860 theagent Matthew
Howland wrote to Valentine Lewis, one of his captains, who had reported that his crew wereasking
to have their lays increased. Howland told Lewis to resist, if he could, but to accede, ifnecessary,
"...because we are satisfied that a good crew is cheaper at high lays than a miserable crew is for
nothing
29Onthe George Howland's eighth voyage (1862-66), seven crewmen (the third mate,
the cooper, the steward, three boatsteerers and a seaman) received increased lays whose value
ranged from $140.39 to $1936.90 and totaled $5557.98.°.
Two other characteristics of the wage bargain acted to temper the amount of risk
transferred from owner to seaman. Although the custom had no direct effect on the finalpayment,
the seaman received room (or at least a bunk or a place to hang his hammock) and board (such as it
was). Mi analysis of the cost of outfitting a vessel indicates that, in terms of dollars of 1880, the
value of a seaman's food probably ranged between $4.05 and $6.94 a month and avenged, pethaps,
ss.so.3'15
Second, with the exception of the captain and sometimes a mate or two, crewmen normally
received an advance before their vessel left port. Usually the advance was equal to between a
quarter and a third of their projected earnings. The funds were used, and were usuallysufficient, to
support wives and families through the duration of the voyage, although they occasionally were
supplemented by further advances, if the voyage proved unusually long or an emergency arose.
The crewmen were charged interest on the advance (usually six percent), but most importantly, the
advances were almost never repaid if the ship sank or returned clean (that is, without oil or bone).
Moreover, if, at the end of a successful voyage, a seaman's account was still in deficit, an agent
hadlittlerecourse other than to ny to convince the whaleman to sign on for another of his --the
agent's --voyages.Since the seaman could sign with another agent and haveaclean slate, the
attempts were seldom successful.
Over eight voyages of the George How/and (1834-1866), five of the Milton, (1869-1885)
and two of the Callao (1871-1877), advances were taken by 413 of the 459 newly signed crewmen.
The advances ranged (in dollars of 1880) from the $1003.25 ($1043.38 nominal) received by the
Second Mate of the George How/and in 1862 to $1.32 ($1.45 nominal) taken by Joseph Howland --
aHowland family member sailing as an able seaman-- of the same ship in 1838. The avenge
advance was $121.66. Over the fifteen voyages, the advances amounted to just less than ten percent
of net revenues (gross returns less charges) or about thirty percent of the crew's share. Moreover,
on the three voyages that yielded their owners less than $700 a month, the advances avenged
twenty- five percent of the total revenue. Finally, although the evidence is very sketchy, it appears
that in the post-bellum period individual advances were somewhat smaller ($115 as opposed to
$127), but, as a fraction of net revenues, the proportion was probably higher.32
The advances were a cause of some concern among the agents and, to a lesser extent,
among the seamen as well. Although the agents were prepared to accept the losses associated with
trUly disasterous voyages, they were less prepared to accept those resulting from desertion. In16
September 1834. Charles Morgan warned one of his Captains. Cornelius Howland, Jr., "Thecrew
are generally indebted to the owners about $110 to $120 each. You will therefore be especially
camfiil of them until you get enough oil to secure that and over it."33 Two months later ina letter
to another of his captains he was even more explicit: "I think you have a good crew but they
mostly are all in debt to the ship from $70 to $1(X) --soplease take care they don't run away before
you get some sperm oil.
Clearly,on the outhound voyage the crewmen had a strong incentive to desert --the
evidence indicates that some whalemen managed to run even before their vessel left New Bedford.
On the return voyage, however, the incentives shifted. It was then that the Captain, and perhaps the
agent, found it in their interest to convince a crewman that he should make an early departure. In
November 1836, eleven months after the Condor had left New Bedford and three months before
she was scheduled to return, Morgan wrote his captain, George H. Dexter, that "tile carpenter has
come and tells a queer tale of his being left purposely, of the whole crew being without bread nine
days, and some other things equally probable. I did not pay much attention to him."35 That
captains and agents tended to ease the path to desertion when the seamen's account stood in surplus
was certainly the view of Navy Lt. Charles Wilkes, who commanded an expedition to the Pacific in
the late 1830's and early 40's. Hewmte: "Many Americans are found on the different islands, who
have been turned ashore from whale-ships, or left behind because they have broken their liberty a
single time near the end of a voyage. Such treatment leaves too much ground not to believe that
they are purposely left, in order to increase the profits of the ship-master or owner." For example,
in the couise of the Monireal's third voyage (1857-52), the vessel left five crewmen, and the
evidence strongly indicates that it was the ship that deserted the crew not the crew who deserted the
ship.3' In a similar vein, the historian A.B.C. Whipple charges that obstreperous men were often
marooned on uninhabited islands and left to die. He describes in some detail the problems that U.S.
consuls had adjudicating between captain and men --didthe men desert or were they marooned?17
In one instance, however, Whipple describes a case where the consul was faced with an obvious
answer. On a four year voyage in the early 1830s, Captain Brown of the Warren R.I. ship Magnet
wrote this message to the consul at Callao, Peru, concerning crewmen whom the consul was to
return to the ship: "I should be happy if you will have the goodness to git the men down as soon as
convenient. I have no one I can trust out of my ship or! would send someone up."38Itis
interesting to note that Brown remained the captain on the next voyage of the Magnet. Clearly the
agent, Joseph Smith Jr. (his father had been the agent for the previous voyage), was not displeased
with the captain's contribution to his crew's desertion.
Although it is probably impossible to discover precisely who won and who lost in this
game, Hohman concludes that, on average, it was probably the whalemen who won and the agents
and owners who lost? Some support for that view can be found in the eight successive voyages
that the George How/and made between December 1834 and April 1886. In dollars of 1880, over
the eight, avenge advances ranged from $77 to $157 (the mean was $112). Over the same voyages
the avenge income that accrued to the agents and owners from the crewmen who had run or were
discharged for cause (i.e. their share less their advance) ranged from a loss of $3732 to a gain of
$7966 and averaged $747 --afigure that amounts to just less than one-fourth of the total amount
advanced. That result, however, depends entirely on the results of the seventh voyage (October
1857 to July 1861). For the other seven the avenge loss to the agents and owners was $284, or
about eight percent of the money loaned. The exceptional voyage began during the depression of
1857, and it was marked by an avenge advance of only $77 --wellbelow the typical $112, and $21
less than that for any of the seven other voyages.
Since there is no systematic evidence on supplements, charges, advances, or renegotiations,
the hypothetical lay payment (the lay times the value of the catch) will be taken as an
approximation to, and ,thus,as an index of, the earnings of the mid-nineteenth century whaleman.
That figure will, however, be adjusted by an estimate of the value of board in certain wage18
comparisons. Even if one is willing to accept these estimates, questions still remain about an
appropriate definition of thewage.Voyages were not short. They ranged in length from the three
months venture into the Atlantic by the Petrelin1866 to the sixty- nine months spent in the Pacific
by the Georgein1847 and the Courierin1850.Contractswere signed before the voyage began,
and payment was not due until the vessel had returned to New Bedford. Moreover, a substantial
fraction of the original crew did not return with the vessel on which they sailed. How then should
the wage be calculated? The answer, of course, is that the measure should depend on thequestion
to be asked. Table 7 provides one such schedule. It reflects the earnings that the whaleman would
have received from his lay had he returned on the vessel on which he departed. It is probably the
best available a post measure. Although it does not include the charges against, nor the
supplements to, the whaleman's lay, it does represent the bulk of his earnings. (Two alternative
wage estimates are discussed in the Appendix.)
4. The Relative Wages of Whalemeri
While the absolute level of wages was certainly a major concern of the whalemen and of
social historians interested in questions of welfare, it was relative wages that dictated career choices
and governed the flow of men into the industry. It is, therefore, the latter measure that is of most
relevance to economic historians involved in analyzing the efficiency of 19th century labor
markets. While the wage ashore furnishes one standard against which to measure whalemen's
earnings, it is the merchant marine that, at least at first glance, appears to provide the most direct
comparisons Although the maritime data are spotty, the work of Stanley Lebergott provides a
basis, although not an ideal one, for a comparison of six of the twelve major whalemen's
occupations.4°
During the 1840's and '50's, at least, the officers who manned the whaling fleet were well
rewarded, if their alternative was service in the merchant marine. Over comparable years, whaling19
captainsreceived,on avenge, $91.55 a month, while their counterparts in the merchant service
earned only $29.54 (see Table 8). Although the contrast is less marked for second and third mates,
whalers still earned more than twice as much as merchant men. A pail of the whaling premium
almost certainly reflected the uncertainty of rewards in whaling. For merchant captains the range of
salaries was from $20 to $35 per month, while the lucky whaling captains who returned with some
catch, earned salaries that varied between $1.20 and $621. For first mates the mercantile range was
$45 ($15 to $60) in contrast to $394 for whalers, and for second mates the ranges were $36 and
$231 respectively.4'
In whaling, officers were not only required to assume a larger risk, but also to bear heavier
responsibilities. Since they often were hunting in unexplored and uncharted waters, it was
necessary that they possess even greater maritime skills than typical officers in the merchant fleet.
In addition, the whaling captain had to understand the whale's habits and migration patterns and to
be prepared to command one of the New Bedford sleighs-- as the small whaleboats were
sometimes called. Although it was the Captain who had the final word, the other officers were also
required to possess skills beyond those asked of a mate in the sister service. On August 8, 1834, for
example, Charles W. Morgan. the agent, wrote one of his captains, "...I have been thinking about
officers, who are however aplenty --Thereis Mr. Plaskjtt who was 3rd mate on the Russell --ifyou
[were going on] a sperm whale voyage I don't think you could get a beuer man. I don't know how
he would answer for right whaling."42
It is clear from a reading of their letters that the agents believed that the choice of the
captain (and probably the first and second mates as well) was immensely important to the success
of a voyage. Evidence that the ageS were not mistaken in this belief can be found in a systematic
quantitative analysis of the records of the voyages.43 A comprehensive multiple regression model--
the dependent variable is a Caves, Christensen, Diewert superlative productivity index and the
independent variables are designed to capture decision, technological, and environmental factors20
that theoryorcontemporaryaccounts suggest might have been important determinants of
productivity --fitto the data on individual voyages shows that productivity waspositively
associated (large coefficient, high significance level) with thecaptain's sham of output (See Table
15b)t In addition, the large lays accruing to captains and other officerscertainly add support to
the imputation of high productivity to them.
If the greater risk and the increased knowledge and skill requirements ledto the relatively
high wages earned by officers, they cannot explain the wages of cooks and seamen (neither skilled
nor semi-skilled). In none of those cases is it possible to argue thatwages in whaling were higher
than those paid by the merchant service, and it is most likely thatthey were, in fact, lower. Over
comparable periods, the ratio of earnings in whaling to earnings in the merchant marine ranged
from .7 for cooks and skilled seamen to .9 for semi- skilled seamen. Moreover, inonly nine of the
forty-four occupation years over which them are comparable data was the ratio equal to or inexcess
of one.
Moreover, these relatively low wages were coupled with variances as high as those of the
much more highly paid officers. While the ranges in the merchant marine fell between 1to 3 and I
to 6 ($10 to $30 for skilled seamen, $5 to $20 for semi-skilled seamen, and $7 to $40 forcooks),
the ranges for the comparable whalers were many times as wide. For cooks,monthly wages ranged
from $0.53 to $60.00 (1 to 113), for semi-skilled seamen from $0.27 to $41.00 (1 to153), and for
skilled seamen from $0.29 to $71.00 (Ito 246).
It is generally recognized that merchant seamen "professed greatcontempt for 'spouters'
and 'blubber-hunters'; and a real whaleman never thought of shifting his allegiance.'t Eachindustry
drew from its own poo1 of labor, and only when both industries were working tocapacity, "was
there competition for those hands who were willing to ship in either service."45 Moreover, neither
the whaling nor the merchant marine agents were forced to confine their search to the domestic
labor market; they were able to draw from an international labor pool. Stanley Lebergott, for21
example, citing contemporary sources, concludes that by the 1840's, officers and mates aside, the
vast majority of seamen on American vessels were foreigners.
The flavor of the typical whaling crew (and the question of the appropriate yardstick
against which to measure their wages) is neatly captured in Charles Nordhoff's account of the
thirty-six man crew of his whaler. "The captain, two mates, and three of the boatsteerers were
American. The third mate and one of the boatsteerers were Portuguese, natives of FayaL. as were
four of our crew,,., The rest of the crew I find enumerated in my log as follows: two lawyers'
clefts, one professional gambler, one ninaway from his father's counting house in New York (this
was also an amateur gambler), one New York "butcher-boy" --hisname was Mose --sixfactory
hands, from some small New England towns, one Boston school boy, six farm boys --1mmvarious
parts of New England and western New York, the four Portuguese before mentioned, who were
whalemen, and the writer hereof, who wrote himself seaman."47Nonihoffwrote about a time late
in the period when the whaling industry had shmnk substantially. In the 1840's and 1850's, when
the industry was at its peak, the fraction of foreigners in a typical crew would probably have been
even larger.
The comparison of the wages of whalemen (but not officers) with those for merchant
seamen produces results that, if they do not confirm the view that there were two separate labor
markets, imply behavior that lies outside the nonnal bounds of economists' assumptions. If,
however, the positions in whaling and in the merchant service were really comparable, and if both
industries had access to the same workers, the whalemen's willingness to accept both lower avenge
and much more variable returns would suggest either that they were drawn from a truly unique pool
of labor --agroup made up of individuals who believed that a small probability of a big win was a
goal worth sacrificing for --orthat they were paying their apprenticeship dues on the way to a
remunerative position as a boatsteerer or officer. More likely, however, they were being hired for
different jobs: merchant seamen as seamen, whalers as oarsmen. It is also possible that they were22
doingthe same job,but thewhajemen were just not very good at it. In fact, the evidence indicates
that there is an element of truth in all four explanations, but at this stage it is still not possible to
assign relative weights to each.
While the merchant marine may have represented the closest maritime alternative fora
whaleman, it appears that it was shore-based opportunities that more than anything else forced
captains and agents to look to foreign ports for their crews. Tables 9 and 10 display the trends in
absolute and relative whaling-to-onshore wage rates for nine professional and skilled classes of
whalemen and for the three classes of seamen.48 Table 11 provides a comparison of nominal and
real wages for whalemen at selected years at the beginning and end of the two decades. A
comparison of the years 1840 to 1843 with 1853 to 1856 indicates that the relative position of all
officers vis-â-vis shorn-based artisans improved by fifteen or more percent. Captains and first and
second mates earned more than the skilled Department of the Army civilians, although their
position, eroded somewhat between 1857 and 1866. For the other.skilled whalemen, the story is
less favorable. While their relative position did not deteriorate (in fact, it may have improved
somewhat), carpenters, cooks, and stewards all earned less than half, boatsteerers only three-fifths
and even coopers less than nine-tenths as much as Margo and Vifiallor's artisans.
The situation of seamen was no better. Although a comparison with the unskilled Amiy
employees in the Northeast suggests no deterioration in their relative position, the wages of skilled,
semi-skilled, and unskilled seamen were only about forty percent of the level of the wates of
workers ashore. If the basis of comparison is shifted either to Edith Abbott's estimates of unskilled
factory workers or to her figures for all uthan unskilled, the relative position of the whalemen
improves, but even able seamen received significantly less than the shore-based workers.
Moreover, overtime1 there appears to have been a not insubstantial degradation in the relative
position of all three classes of whalemen. The whaling seamen did, however, earn about as much
as Massachusetts textile workers, chiefly female employees.23
It is unfortunate that the estimates of whaling earnings cannot beextended backward into
the 1820's and '30's The secondary literature indicates that, in those earlydecades, the workforce
was largely native American (i.e. seamen whose fathers had beenborn on this side of the Atlantic --
includinga not insubstantial number of blacks), the majority ofwhom were trained seamen.5°
Although a precise answer depends on the wage series andthe price deflator chosen, it appears that
between 1840-43 and 1855-58 the real wages of unskilled workers in theUnited States may have
risen by twenty percent or they may have fallen by as much as live percent. No matterwhat price
index is chosen, the real wages of all "enlisted" whalemen, appear to have declined by morethan
the most pessimistic of the onshore estimates. Officers, on the other hand, clearlygained.5' It is,
however, difficult to see how, given the wage differentials, the whaling industrycould have
continued to recruit trained Americans for enlisted jobs over the two ante bellumdecades. The
most probable explanation, of course, is that they did not. Instead the agents appearto have turned
more and more to unskilled Americans and to both skilled and unskilled foreignworkers. It appears
that even black sailors --whoseonshore opportunities must have been severely constrained --
desertedthe whaling fleet. Although her data are somewhat difficult to interpret, Martha Putney's
survey of whaling crew lists appears to indicate that there were, on average,2.8 black Americans on
each New Bedford vessel sailing between 1803 and 1840, but only 1.5 in the years 1841-1843and
18461860.52
It could, of course, have been otherwise. The industry might have represented such an
unusual opportunity for risk lovers that wages shrank as increased numbers of gamblers competed
for the limited number of jobs. After all, the presence of both professional and amateur gamblers
among Nortihoff s shipmates might indicate something about the degreeof risk aversion shared by
at least the American component of that crew, and Hohrnan does argue that, "the device of the lay
with its tantalizing possibility of a lucky voyage, served to obscure the avenge earnings."5324
In a general sense, the dataon wages indicatethat, at leastwithinthe industry, the labor
market appears to have worked quite well (see Table 12). Some cluesas to the actual efficiency of
the market --atleast the market internal to the industry -.maybe gleaned from an atialysis of
10.730 unskilled seamen who departed New Bedfordover the twenty years 1840-1858 and 1866.
Greenhands were chosen because there seemed less chance for bias introducedbydifferences in
skill. For those neophyte whalemen, the real monthlywage averaged $8.34 in dollars of 1860, but
there were inter ground differentials. While lays in the Atlanticground averaged 1/158 (.00633),
those in the Indian 1/179 (.00559). those in the Pacific 1/189(.00530), arid those in the Arctic 1/197
(.00509), differences in productivity meant that the ordering ofwages received was quite different.
Greenhands who signed on for the Atlantic ground earned, onavenge, only $7.84. Thanks to the
banner catches by the Carnela, Mary Ann, and the Tropic Bird in1853, that figure is more than the
$7.44 avenge for the Indian, but it is below the $8.49 earned in thePacific and only five-sixths of
the $9.30 reward for service in the Arctic?
To aid in reaching an understanding of the workings of thewhaling labor market, an
attempt was made to model the wage bargain. Each agent and potential crewmanwas assumed to
be await of: (1) the ground to which thevoyage was to beprimarily directed (external evidence
indicates that the choice of ground was one of the agent's firstdecisions, and his labor recmitment
decisions were made in light of that choice; moreover, the laborcontract frequently spelled out the
projected destination of the voyage)55; (2) the average catch and length ofvoyage of all vessels
returning to New Bedford from the designated ground during the previousyear (that information
was readily available in the Whalemen's Shipping List and Merchant'sTranscript, a local
newspaper); (3) the avenge probability of a vessel returning safely from thatground over the
previous five years --againinformation well documented in the local press. The model restson the
assumption that, although it was the lay that was the actual focus of thenegotiation between agent
and prospective crewman, it was the expected realwage (or real cost) that was at the heart of the25
bargain.
Table 13 reports the results of two alternative, but not independent, specificationsof the
model. The dependent variable of Model 1 is the real value of the averagecatch of vessels that had
returned from the designated ground in the previous year. multiplied by the lay negotiatedby a
greenhand in the present year-- it is, in short, a proxy for the expectedreal wage.56 The dependent
variable in Model 2 is the expected real wage variable of Model I multiplied by the average
probability (calculated over the previous five years) of a vessel that set outfor the designated
ground actually returning safely to New Bedford.
There are seven independent variables. Four are suggested by theory or by contemporary
accounts, while the remainder are included to test the completeness of themodel. In the first set, in
addition to "the common wage ashore" (included to get at the competitive pressures emanating
from other labor markets) are variables designed to capture financial risk, time at sea,and the risk
of spending more time at sea than expected.57 In the second set are the three grounddummies--the
Pacific was chosen as the base, and it is the implicit fourth ground. If the model captures the
essence of the wage bargain, the coefficients on the ground dummies shouldbe close to zero.
The results are mixed. The adjusted r2s are very good, given the element of luck in the
industry, and the F values are both very high and significant. Moreover, if attentionis focused on
the first set of variables, the model appears to have captured the principle elements of the wage
negotiation that both theory and the personal tastes and biases implied by the qualitativeliterature
suggest should have dominated the bargain. On the other hand, the groundcoefficients indicate
that, even after the effects of the first set of variables have been factored out, there still remain
substantial differences between expected earnings in the Atlantic and Indian grounds. on the one
hand, and in the Pacific and Arctic, on the other.
Theory suggests that workers usually prefer lesser to greater financial risk, and this26
conjecture is borne out by the analysis, The coefficient on "financial risk" ispositive, large, and
very significant. Even in the least compelling case (Model 2), given a dependentmean of $7.37, it
appears that a greenhand required a bonus of 35 per cent tocompensate him for signing in the year
preceded by the maximum as compared with the one marked by the minimumvariance.
The variable "time at sea" isintended to be an index of theexpected duration of the voyage
for which the gitenhand signed on. It is measuredby the avenge duration of the voyages--by
hunting ground--of vessels returning to New Bedford in the previousyear. The industry's
historians point out that the desertion rate rose as the length of thevoyage increased, and so they
infer that whalemen preferred shortvoyages. It is likely, however, that the observed association
reflects not a preference for short voyages, but a perfecUy reasonablepreference for successful
ones. Exceptionally long voyages tended to be unsuccessful. Strong-mindedcaptains, unwilling to
return with empty cargo space, would remain at sea, despite thegnnnblings of the crew. Leaving
these cases aside, however, many men must have prefentd thesecurity of employment offered by
longer voyages--a three year voyage rather than one planned to end in twoyears, for example. If
men with these preferences dominated the market, one couldexpect the sign on the coefficient of
the variable "time at sea" to be negative, as it is: menrequired a premium for a short voyage.
On the other hand, the sign on the variable "risk ofspending more time at sea than
anticipated"-- a measure of the variance of the "time at sea" variable-- mightvery well be positive,
since the variable is intended to pickup anticipations of chances of success. In fact, the sign is
negative and the coefficient, highly significant, resultsvery difficult to rationalize.
With this exception, the first set of variables seem tocapture the essence of the negotiation
and indicate that the market was working fairly efficiently. Theground dummies are less
successful. If the model were correct and complete, one couldexpect the coefficients on the
dummies to be insignificantly different from zero, but such isnot the case. On the positive side, in
Model 1, recruitment for voyages to the Arctic groundrequired a premium of about 8 or 9 percent,27
a reasonable result in view of the dangers encountered in theArctic. Adjustment for physical risk
converts the premium into a small discount--less than 4 percent?8
Problems arise, however, in the cases of both the Atlantic and the Indian grounds.After
adjustingfor"physical,' "financial," and "at sea" risk and for the length of the voyage, a
prospective hand appears to have been willing to sacrifice $2.20 amonth to serve in the Indian and
an incredible $5.80 a month to serve in the Atlantic, rather thanthe Pacific. While the differences
may reflect very strong tastes and biases, it is more likelythat the model is simply incomplete, and
the dummies are picking up the effects of the missing variables. After all, apartfrom the variable
"common wage ashore"--which. incidentally, has the right sign-- the model leaves outof account
the behavior of those people and institutions on the other side of the market from the seamen.
Despite this shortcoming, the model provides quite helpful hints about the natureof the market
S. Deterioration in Productivity and Crew Quality
Although the exact connections remain somewhat speculative, the years from1840 thmugh
1858 were characterized by a decline in vessel productivity, on the one hand, and a gradually
increasing proportion of unskilled workers and of illiterates among the vessels' crews, on theother
(See Table 13). Between 1840-43 and 1856-58, for example, the average productivity index
declined by more than a third, illiteracy rose by neatly thirty percent, and the proportion of
unskilled seamen in the crew, by more than a quarter. In the early 1840's less than a fifth of the
crew were illiterate and nine out of every twenty whaleman could claim at least some maritime
experience. On the eve of the Civil War, however, more than a quarter of the crew could not sign
their names, and almost three-fourths of the deckhands had never been to sea.
As Table 14 indicates, between 1840 and 1858 both measures of crew quality (literacy and
the proportion of seamen who were at least semi-skified) declined, as did the index of avenge
voyage productivity. These common changes need not bespeak causal connections.In order to28
pursue that topic further, a model designed to explain productivitychange in general is required.
The effects of changes in crew quality and themovements of other relevant independent variables
can then be systematically assessed. To complete theexplanation it is, of course, also necessary to
consider how and why crew quality declined and how themanagers of whaling voyages dealt with
this development The place to begin is with the model.
The same model used to examine the contributions ofthe captain to a voyage's
productivity can also be employed as part of the effort to deal with theproblem of the changing
quality of labor?9 It has been argued in the whaling literature that, becauseof improving
opportunities ashore, the quality of labor available to the whalingindustry declined as time passed.
An attempt was made to capture this developmentby introducing indexes of real wage rates ashore
as independent variables. Increases in wages ashore, if the best whalerswere bid away from the
fleet, would, it is assumed, lead to a deterioration of thequality of the whaling labor force and, thus,
reduce productivity.6°
The results of fining the model to the data from the fullperiod (1820 to 1896) are reported
in the first column of Table 15a. It is obvious that themodel appears to explain the data, at least
from a statistical point of view. The F statistic, theadjusted R2 the signs and values of the
coefficients, and the significance levels are excellent. The issue ofcurrent moment has to do with
the quality of labor, and the variable of interest is thecommon wage index. The sign on the index
is negative, the coefficient large, and the significance levelhigh: them would appear to be some
support for the "bidding away: hypothesis.
Column 2 reports the resujts of fitting almost thesame model to data from the more
restricted time period 1840-1858 and 1866 --yearsfor which direct measures of labor quality exist.
Between the specification of the modelreported in column 1 and the one reported in column 2,
them is just one minor difference: thetechnology dummy employed in the first is irrelevant for the
shorter time period. Despite this difference, the results ofthe two models are very similar --a fact29
that is reassuring: the relationships depicted in the equation are very stable. Indeed, the degree of
stability across the four regressions is striking.
The results of fitting a third specification for the more restricted period are reported in
column 3. In this instance, direct measures of labor quality are substituted for the indexes of real
wage rates. The coefficients on the quality variables are very small, indeed, and they are not
significantly different from zero. There are other small changes between the results of the second
and third specifications, but these are not important The results obtained from the third model are
important in one respect: the quality indexes do not appear to have been related to productivity
changes.
This apparent paradox may be resolved by noting that there may very well have been two
processes at work, both involving crew quality. First, the pull of onshore wages --takentogether
with the agents' attempts to lessen labor turnover by substituting unskilled for skified whalemen --
tendedto reduce the quality of workers and, therefor, productivity. Second, new techniques that
permitted lower quality seamen to function acceptably were introduced. Agents who accepted these
technical changes were able to employ lower quality seamen with some significant success. Across
time, then, one might expect to find that the quality factor forces productivity down, but in the cross
section (once allowance is made for the cross-time deterioration) vessels that adopted the new
technology could employ lower quality crews and ,therefore,more productive than the vessels
that did not. The last specification (see Column 4) attempts to separate these two phenomena. The
results are plausible. Across time, the decline in quality (i.e. the loss of good crewmen to shore
jobs) hurt productivity. In the cross section, however, vessels that employed fewer skilled workers
were more productive than those that did not.
The evidence, then, suggests that the argument may be correct, but whether or not it is
persuasive depends upon an analysis of the nature of the decline in labor quality and the kinds of
adjustments to it that were made by agents and captains.30
The rise in the proportion of illiterate and unskilled seamen in thecrew of a typical vessel
does appear to have been the product, at least inpart, of the agents' attempts to recruit crew
members who would be less likely to desert. A reading of thecontemporary sources suggests that
the agents, increasingly concerned with thevery high rates of labor turnover, sought to employ
unskilled workers who, because of their lack of infonnation and skifis,would find it difficult to
leave their vessel and sign on another. Nonihoff, forexample, reports that despite the almost
constant demand for whaling crews. "to a sailor this avenue to a whaleship ishermatically sealed.
Neither here [New York] nor in New Bedford is he likely to beshipped --forexperience has taught
the captains and owners of whaling vessels thatyour real tar is too uneasy a creature to be kept in
good order for so long a cruise as whalemen now-a-days generally make."6' Thesame policy was
also noted by Hobman who reports, "The shippingagent preferred to deal with men ignorant of the
actual conditions of the industry because they were more easilyimposed upon, and also because
they were more dependable in observing their contracts."
As voyage length increased, so did desertions --HermanMelville deserted twice during the
heady 1 840's--and, if the agents' letters and the remaining account books are to bebelieved, labor
turnover emerged as an increasingly important problem. Not only did desertion reduceprofits
directly through the losses associated with unrepaid advances, but alsoindirectly through its effects
on productivity. Since a vessel's complement usually consisted of only a fewmore crewmen (the
shipkeepers) than the number required to provide six men for each whaleboat, anunreplaced
seaman could mean the loss of an entire boat. Probably more importantwas the effect on
productivity of the replacement of a member of one of the "closely linked whaleboatcrews, where
the loss of a single cool and expert oarsman often cut downmaterially the captures made by a
certain boat. "
Althoughtechnological change was not the driving force, it did act to relax certain
production constraints. Thus it permitted the captains and agents to adjust their workforce ina way31
that they thought would reduce turnover. Historians of technology long argued that there waslittle
improvement in the design of sailing ships over the course of the nineteenth centuryand virtually
none before 1850. More recent work has shown that they were wrong. As early asthe 1830's iron
rod rigging and turnbuckles had begun to replace the traditional hemp lines, and, it took less skill to
work aloft.M Between 1820 and 1845 a wide range of new equipment -capstansand windlasses,
iron strapped blocks, geared steering, hold ventilators, and geared winches--came on thema&et.
Again, as in the manufacturing sector, these changes meant the work could be done by unskffled
workers. Finally, after 1850 there was a near revolution aloft. Sails and rigging were almost totally
redesigned. Naval architects recognized that increasing the number of sails made handling easier,
and, heretofore conventional wisdom aside, they concluded that flat sails were more efficient than
baggy ones. Ship owners responded by "subdividing the larger sails, abolishing the studding sails
and other expensive 'kites,' and radically altering the sail's design —baggysails were replaced by
much flatter ones."6' In addition, building on the improvements in the 1820's and '30's, iron
fittings became common, chains replaced rope, and mast design was greatly simplified.67 The
result was again greater speed, and more importantly for whaling, the need for fewer skilled
seamen.
For whaling vessels the gain in speed was of marginal importance. There may have been
some Eeduction in the time of outbound and inbound voyages and in the time necessary to shift
from one ground to another, but speed was never of primary concern, and it was of almost no
importance during the period of active hunting. Similarly there was probably little gain from the
labor-saving dimensions of the technical changes. The size of whaling crews was established
chiefly by hunting demands and always included many more men than those required to sail the
vessel. In fact, for whaling, the innovation of the new technology probably resulted in an increase
in total crew size. The changes did, however, make it possible to alter dramatically the skifi profile
of the crew. The changes aloft, by greatly easing and simplifying the tasks of selling, changing,32
and furling the sails, made it possible for unskilledcrewmen to handle most of the above deck work
that previously had required trained hands. The technical innovationsthus made it possible to
substitute greenhands for able and ordinazy seamen.
The evidence, both quantitative and qualitative,conclusively demonstrates that, by any
traditional definition, the quality of whaling crews deterioratedover at least the two decades
preceding the Civil War. The qualitative sources suggest that the declinewas the result of a
conscious decision by the agents --adecision aimed at reducing labor turnover and, thus,
increasing profits. It is, however, probably impossible to prove that the newdefactolaborpolicies
were the product of an innovative attempt to reduce labor turnover rather thana reaction to the
increasing difficulty of recruiting native Yankee whalemen --adifficulty rooted in the rising
competition for onshore labor.
It may be only coincidental, but the developing manufacturingsector also appears to have
undergone a similar substitution of unskilled for skilled labor under theaegis of new technical
opportunities at about the same period of time. Although it appears unlikely that laborturnover
played a significant role in that case, labor historians have recentlyrecognized that the development
of new technologies made it possible formanagers to deskill their labor force. (301dm and
Sokoloff, for example, note, "the relationship between firm size and theemployment of women and
children within industries indicates that the diffusion of newlarge scale technologies was
associated with the substitution of women and children for men."
In whaling, however, the policy was not costless to eitheragent or crewman. It greatly
increased the twin problems of supervision and discipline, and the directcost of the necessary
discipline was borne in the first instance by the crew. As one chronicler of theindustry reports.
"Examination of the crews' account books gives an insight into thechanges taking place in the kind
of men who shipped aboard whalers and the measures takenby agents and captains to compensate
for the increasingly poor quality of the crews. Whether the decreasein quality of personnel led to33
harsh measures or whether the methods of the captains, agents, and landsharks led to the poor
quality was a question probably debated endlessly by the owners and agents There is,
however, general agreement, "that the owners were content to ship such (untrained] hands
because capable and bnitaily aggressive mates could train them during their long months at sea."0
The stories of brutality on whaling vessels are legion, but they are neatly encapsulated in
the report of the U.S. revenue cutter Thetes on its return from a trip to the Arctic whaling fleet in
September 1906. On board were 14 sick whalers, 30 who had been picked up shipwrecked, and
two whaling captains, H.E. Bodfish of the William Bayless and E.W. Newth, of the Jeannette, in
irons. Bothcaptainswere charged with manslaughter in the deaths of seamen. Bodfish was, in
fact, accused of kicking a seamen to death."
The need for increased supervision and discipline meant that a vessel required more
"capable and brutally aggressive mates," and they were not costless. The new labor policy,
although ridding the industry of some of those skilled seamen who knew when and how to desert,
forced the agents to hire more supervisory personnel. The result was a change in size and
composition of the crew that led directly to a significant increase in total direct labor costs.
Tables 16 and 17 compare avenge crews in the two four year periods 1840-43 and 1855-
58. Between those dates, despite the substitution of smaller barks for larger ships-- a substitution
that should have reduced crew size by three percent --thesize of a typical crew actually increased
by 2.3 men or about nine percent (from just less than twenty-six to just over twenty-eight men). Of
equal interest, however, are the changes that occurred within the crew. The increase of 2.3 was the
result of an increase of 3.5 in the number of unskilled seamen, a reduction of about 2.0 in the
number of skilled and semi skilled seamen, and an increase of .8 in the number of "professionals."
Not surprisingly the number of artisans and service personnel did not change. By the end of the
period a typical vessel carried somewhat more than an extra four-tenths of an officer and three
tenths of a skilled maritime professional. Those additions constitute a ten percent increase in the34
number of crewmen in eachofthose two job categories.
Assuming that the extra officers were most likely third mates and that skilled maritime
workers were paid as much as boatsteerers, the substitution of greenhands andskilledofficers and
boatsteerers for skilled and semi-skilled seamen meant that labor costs roseon avenge by about
$24.40 a month or about $1050 for a typical forty-three monthvoyage. That estimate, of course,
does not reflect the fraction of the increasing wages of existing officers thatcan be attributed to
theirincreasedsupervisory duties.
The effects of the change can be seen in Table 18. The Table displays, byyear, the fraction
of the catch that accrued to labor through their lay shares (i.e. excluding charges,supplements, and
the value of room and boaM). Despite the traditional views --viewssubscribed to by Hohman and
others before him --that:(1) on every vessel the sum of the lays contracted for by the officers and
men was very close to thirty percent of the value of the catch, and (2) that the total was invariant
over time --thesefigures tell a quite different story? Over the two decades in question, the
average labor lay share rose from about thirty-one percent to about thirty-six percent --anincrease
of about one-seventh.
It should be recognized that the increase in the crew's share came in the face ofa shift in
the geographic distribution of the fleet --ashift that saw a reduction in the proportion of vessels
hunting in the short lay Atlantic and Indian grounds and an increase in the fraction working the
long lay grounds in the Pacific and Arctic. While in 1840-43 the avenge total lay was higher in the
Atlantic and Indian grounds (.3 19 as opposed to .310 in the Pacific), by 1855-58, despite the
continuing intergrowid differences in whaler's lays. both the Atlantic-Indian and the Pacific-Arctic
grounds displayed the same average figure (.359). This apparent anomaly reflects the fact that,
although the average crew size had increased in both, it had risen by less than eight percent in the
Atlantic-Indian ground in contrast to the twelve percent increase in the Pacific-Arctic theater.35
The change in labor policies, whether initially innovative or merely reactive, did apparently
result in higher total factor productivity. The question remains: did the increase in productivity
offset the transfer of four and a half percent of output from owners to workers? What was the effect
of the agents' "labor market innovation" on profits?
6.Conclusion
Thesystem of labor payments based on contracted lays was adopted by whaling agents and
owners as early as the seventeenth century. Although it bears some superficial resemblance to
payment schemes adopted in certain agricultural activities and some branches of fishing, the
structure, as it evolved in the whaling industry, was unique. The economist Henry George greatly
approved of the system of payment; however, it has been almost universally condemned by
historians who have attempted to chronicle the development of the whaling industry? Both
Samuel Morison and Elmo Hohman, for example, complained about the negative impact that the
institution had on the wages of seamen.Although Hohman was somewhat more temperate,
Morison referred to the lay contract as "a foul system of exploitation." Nor has more recent
historiography served to improve the reputation of the lay. In a recent article, the labor historian
Gerald 0. Williams blames the existence of the "Yankee Hellships" ("...legs and aims broken are
considered nothing, ribs stamped in by heavy sea boots had to mend as best they could, faces
smashed like rotten apples by iron belaying pins had to get well or fear worse treaunent, eyes
closed by a brawny mate's fist had to see...") on the system of wage payment.75
Williams goes on to argue that, towani the end of the nineteenth century, the agents and
owners reaped yet another boon from the system --aboon that could not have been anticipated at
the industry's peak. Because of the judicial interpretation of the lay contract, the owners found
themselves almost entirely exempt from the strictures imposed by the federal laws designed to
improve the life of American seamen. These acts included the Shipping Commissioner Act of 187236
that, together with it amendments, made it more difficult toShanghai sailors and guaranteed
mariners a minimwn level of rations,space, and medical treatment, the White Act (1898) that
abolished both criminal penalties for desertion andcorporal punishment, and the Seamen's Act of
1915 that provided for the minimum safety standards(e.g. lifeboats).'6
Despite its critics, the system did have many interesting, and someundoubtedly useful,
attributes. Certainly owners benefitted from the transfer of a portion of the riskof the voyage to the
crew. However, given the regularized system of advances, thepayment of mom and board, and the
occasional renegotiations of lays, the transfer was certainly notcomplete. Moreover, even some of
the critics of the lay contract (Hohman, for example) admit that at leastsome crew members
reveled in a chance to participate in the "big lottery."
Without question, given the well-documented need for cooperationamong the members of
a vessel's crew and the difficulties of designing an effective monitoringstnictuze, the lay contract
provided an incentive system that rewarded cooperation, and it should haveencouraged such
behavior. In fact, every contemporary account of the hunt and thesubsequent rendering
underscores the level of cooperation among the crewmen.Finally, the system appears to have been
flexible enough to pennut agents to adjust rapidly toemerging inter-ground differences in
productivity and to the reduced skill demands of the new sailing technologies.38
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THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CREWMEN IN EACH
OCCUPATION CATEGORY ON A VOYAGE,


























ALL W. ALL W.
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTICGROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 27.7 24.0 27.5 28.4
1841 16.5 15.6 17.0 16.6 25.6 22.1 24.8 26.8
1842 16.5 15.3 163 16.9 25.4 21.2 25.6 26.7
1843 16.5 17.0 15.4 16.9 26.5 23.5 26.0 26.7
1844 16.1 15.0 15.7 16.3 26.2 30.0 25.2 26.8
1845 165 14.0 16.7 16.6 25.6 22.3 26.4 25.9
1846 16.1 13.5 15.9 16.2 25.0 20.8 24.7 25.5
1847 16.0 15.7 16.1 25.5 24.5 26.0
1848 162 15.0 15.6 16.2 25.3 22.0 24.2 25.4
1849 15.7 15.0 15.5 15.8 17.0 24.4 22.5 23.5 25.0 23.0
1850 15.1 15.5 15.0 15.0 15.2 22.2 18.5 20.6 22.2 22.9
1851 14.8 14.3 13.0 15.2 14.8 21.4 19.4 20.5 21.7 22.0
1852 14.6 14.7 14.4 14.6 14.5 21.0 19.4 19.9 23.2 20.9
1853 14.5 14.0 14.7 14.6 14.3 20.9 19.3 19.9 21.2 20.7
1854 14.1 12.7 13.8 14.1 15.0 20.3 16.2 20.5 20.4 21.3
1855 13.6 13.2 122 13.9 13.9 20.1 19.4 19.2 20.1 20.4
1856 13.3 12.7 12.5 13.4 13.6 19.6 16.5 19.8 19.6 19.8
1857 13.8 12.0 14.4 13.7 14.0 19.4 17.0 19.3 19.8 19.2
1858 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.0 13.8 20.7 19.3 20.0 20.7 21.4
1866 14.0 12.9 15.0 15.0 16.0 21.7 21.2 20.8 22.5 22.5
AVG. 152 14.4 15.0 15.4 14.7 23.2 20.8 22.6 23.7 21.3
Note:A lay of 16.5 is really 1/16.5 or .060652
PANEL B
SECOND MATES THIRD MATES
ALL W. ALL W.
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACWIC ARCTICGROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 46.3 42.5 49.0 46.5 65.3 63.8 65.6
1841 42.1 38.0 41.2 43.1 64.2 67.5 63.0 64.2
1842 41.7 36.4 41.0 43.9 61.6 49.0 62.2 62.4
1843 43.3 48.5 41.4 44.0 65.8 70.0 64.6 65.4
1844 40.8 36.0 37.9 42.7 60.9 65.0 57.0 63.4
1845 43.1 37.5 42.9 44.1 62.3 53.0 60.2 64.6
1846 41.1 37.0 38.7 42.7 53.5 62.9 63.6
1847 39.6 39.9 42.3 61.1 58.5 61.9
1848 40.3 35.0 40.2 39.2 61.7 65.5 61.5
1849 39.4 37.5 38.1 39.9 42.8 58.8 57.0 57.6 59.4 57.5
1850 36.9 26.0 37.4 37.4 37.1 58.6 57.7 60.6
1851 37.2 34.0 38.3 37.9 36.7 55.0 48.7 51.9 55.7 55.2
1852 35.6 30.6 37.0 36.0 38.5 54.5 52.7 52.2 54.9 55.2
1853 36.1 29.9 32.3 36.7 37.6 52.7 45.7 54.6 52.2 54.4
1854 34.8 28.3 34.5 35.3 35.8 52.3 48.3 51.4 52.7 52.8
1855 34.7 32.2 32.6 35.3 34.1 50.9 53.4 51.0 50.2 50.5
1856 33.6 32.0 35.2 33.8 34.2 50.8 65.0 54.5 51.3 47.3
1857 32.7 29.3 32.0 33.5 32.7 49.6 40.0 44.5 50.8 51.4
1858 34.8 29.3 31.0 35.7 35.1 54.3 50.0 52.6 54.0 56.2
34.5 33.4 32.0 35.6 38.0 53.9 53.3 55.0 56.0 51.6
AVG. 38.4 34.4 37.6 39.3 36.6 57.4 54.6 57.0 58.4 53.953
PANEL C
BOATSTEERERS COOPERS
ALL W. ALL W.
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTICGROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 91.0 85.8 94.2 91.4 59.0 54.0 55.0 60.0
1841 84.9 73.1 81.7 88.8 56.4 59.0 54.7 56.5
1842 83.8 68.2 84.6 87.5 61.3 68.3 59.5 62.6
1843 90.3 90.0 86.1 91.9 60.6 47.1 59.6 62.0
1844 86.9 77.5 79.8 91.4 59.5 55.0 62.0 58.4
1845 90.0 64.3 89.7 91.1 54.1 68.0 54.2 52.9
1846 88.8 58.3 83.5 92.2 59.0 60.0 59.8 59.1
1847 88.4 78.8 91.5 56.7 57.6 56.4
1848 91.4 62.5 86.5 92.3 56.7 52.5 57.4
1849 86.0 84.2 82.4 87.3 92.0 57.8 75.0 56.5 58.0 60.0
1850 87.7 45.0 71.5 88.4 91.4 52.3 50.0 51.6 54.2
1851 89.3 69.1 81.6 91.5 93.4 54.4 52.0 59.5 54.0 53.0
1852 86.3 64.6 83.8 88.9 91.7 56.4 58.7 61.4 54.0 61.9
1853 83.4 65.3 78.7 84.0 87.5 56.6 70.8 48.8 55.8 56.1
1854 83.7 57.9 74.4 85.0 89.7 58.8 64.0 58.6 57.2 60.0
1855 86.0 75.4 83.0 87.1 88.2 54.3 52.0 54.2 54.8 54.9
1856 84.6 74.2 75.8 86.5 87.0 52.8 50.0 52.6 52.5 56.0
1857 87.3 67.8 83.2 88.6 89.7 55.5 50.0 60.0 54.2 55.5
1858 88.4 82.5 82.2 89.2 90.6 55.4 53.3 49.0 56.7 54.2
1866 89.3 81.3 88.6 94.9 96.7 66.1 65.0 61.0 70.3 65.0
AVG. 87.4 70.9 82.5 89.5 90.7 57.2 59.0 56.3 57.3 57.354
PANEL D
CARPENTERS COOKS
ALL W. ALL W,
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 150.8 150.0 151.2 141.9 140.0 147.5 141.0
1841 1503 130.0 145.0 154.2 135.1 120.4 135.8 137.9
1842 150.9 138.3 149.2 155.4 133.0 109.4 134.4 139.2
1843 1515 140.0 161.7 149.8 139.9 158.5 135.0 141.7
1844 153.3 140.0 145.4 158.9 139.7 100.0 133.0 144.9
1845 161.9 100.0 162.9 162.2 141.2 103.3 141.7 143.3
1846 160.8 135.0 160.0 161.6 138.4 128.3 135.6 140.8
1847 163.5 155.6 166.1 1383 134.3 140.2
1848 165.2 200.0 162.7 145.0 130.0 138.0 146.6
1849 158.2 1525 155.7 161.6 1573 134.8 135.0 136.0 134.7 140.0
1850 165.6 145.0 165.8 170.4 139.2 82.5 127.0 140.9 146.2
1851 169.2 143.6 163.0 171.6 175.2 142.9 128.2 144.5 1435 147.8
1852 167.9 151.7 164.3 171.9 165.7 138.1 121.7 144.0 139.1 143.3
1853 168.4 140.0 165.0 167.6 175.4 139.0 130.6 126.7 141.4 139.1
1854 168,4 159.6 166.7 170.0 1775 140.8 136.2 138.3 143.7 148.3
1855 172.0 159.6 170.0 1713 1773 136.7 136.0 140.0 143.1 152.1
1856 170.7 170.0 160.0 175.5 159.2 143.2 135.0 135.8 143.7 1483
1857 171.6 1325 170.6 175.4 170.0 1423 123.3 132.2 145.6 1433
1858 172.7 160.0 177.0 170.9 177.5 146.6 138.8 143.3 1473 148.8
184.5 173.1 180.0 198.0 175.0 149.4 149.1 144.0 150.0 152.0
AVG. 163.9 1454 162.4 166.1 171.0 140.3 126.6 137.4 142.4 146.355
PANEL E
STEWARDS SKILLED SEAMEN*
ALL W. ALL W.
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 137.0 130.0 110.0 141.7 1423 131.6 150.0 145.2
1841 1333 125.0 130.0 135.8 138.0 120.3 134.0 144.4
1842 132.7 123.1 130.2 140.2 135.0 112.5 134.9 145.4
1843 137.0 150.0 137.6 136.4 143.9 155.0 141.0 144.8
1844 136.7 160.0 135.0 1383 147.1 134.2 130.9 154.2
1845 137.3 105.0 137.0 138.1 150.9 95.0 1483 152.6
1846 139.0 125.0 1373 141.2 146.1 105.0 138.0 151.4
1847 137.6 131.2 140.1 147.9 143.7 151.6
1848 141.6 160.0 139.2 141.3 150.4 135.0 150.5 150.3
1849 1364 127.5 140.4 135.0 145.0 1483 148.0 146.5 148.9 162.5
1850 138.7 116.7 138.1 145.6 151.6 97.1 140.6 152.9 1604
1851 136.8 118.9 132.0 139.9 138.2 156.0 139.0 154.1 157.7 164.8
1852 1313 105.8 139.8 131.9 136.2 153.0 133.2 150.8 155.1 160.8
1853 133.4 125.7 130.$ 134.1 135.9 150.6 131.6 140.0 150.8 158.7
1854 134.1 1183 1293 136.0 136.0 1513 125.0 134.6 153.6 161.8
1855 132.8 120.0 127.9 133.6 1393 156.6 143.0 160.7 157.1 157.6
1856 134.0 136.2 135.0 135.1 137.6 156.7 143.0 152.0 158.4 157.8
1857 131.6 123.3 1203 131.8 138.8 160.8 145.0 153.6 163.6 159.7
1858 141.6 133.3 137.0 142.1 142.9 1673 150.0 145.0 169.8 1693
1866 134.4 125.3 145.0 1393 142.0 1633 151.0 159.4 175.3 1742
AVG. 135.9 128.5 132.1 1373 139.8 150.9 131.3 145.4 154.2 162.5
*SkilledSeamen include Seaman, Able Seaman, Whaling Seaman, Extra Prepaitd Seaman, Bow Hand, Lead, and
Lookout.56
PANEL F
SEMI-SKILLED SEAMEN UNSKILLED SEAMEN
ALL W. ALL W.
YEAR GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC GROUNDS ATLANTICINDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
1840 160.1 144.2 165.0 161.9 178.0 153.9 185.5 178.1
1841 153.0 137.8 141.8 163.2 171.0 149.0 170.1 181.6
1842 1553 119.1 151.9 166.2 179.8 151.4 186.1 180.6
1843 164.2 176.2 155.9 166.1 178.1 189.2 172.7 180.5
1844 161.5 160.0 142.2 168.4 1793 170.5 168.1 185.9
1845 165.8 127.9 1673 170.2 187.8 132.7 188.2 189.6
1846 162.2 137.5 149.7 166.4 179.2 1243 173.5 1833
1847 165.7 148.6 169.8 184.2 172.2 187.1
1848 1713 150.0 174.5 170.9 187.2 160.0 177.1 189.1
1849 157.6 146.8 148.8 160.8 168.3 181.8 164.4 174.5 185.9 193.2
1850 169.0 173.8 166.6 171.8 170.0 185.1 103.4 166.5 186.6 193.7
1851 170.4 165.0 170.1 173.2 173.9 189.5 171.6 184.9 191.4 196.7
1852 172.3 143.6 157.4 177.4 168.9 186.1 151.7 180.2 191.9 194.3
1853 1683 136.0 174.0 168.1 176.1 1853 160.4 175.5 187.3 188.6
1854 166.4 134.6 153.8 167.2 177.8 184.8 150.1 174.5 186.7 193.7
1855 166.7 164.8 150.6 1663 176.4 189.0 1723 183.9 190.7 195.2
1856 167.4 165.3 166.9 171.8 168.9 190.4 163.7 178.9 194.4 192.9
1857 175.2 148.8 163.7 171.2 191.4 196.2 166.1 187.4 194.4 212.7
1858 178.1 150.4 182.6 177.7 185.1 192.9 178.5 183.0 194.3 197.3
1866 1853 1693 182.9 196.8 188.0 201.1 189.6 193.1 215.2 203.2
AVG. 166.79 150.1 160.7 170.3 176.8 1853 158.1 178.8 188.7 1963
*Semi-SkilledSeamen include Ordinary Seamen, Oarsman, Mariner, "One Voyage", "Has been coasting", Past Green
Hand", "Used to Boat", "5YearsCrawling", "Has been to Sea", "Extra Green Hand", Boatman, "in the BOats".
**UnskilledSeamen include Greerthand, Landsman, Green Oarsman, Green Portugese, Green Canaka, GreenMalay,
Spanish Islands, Green Black, Green Colored.
Sources: see text.57
TABLE 3
AVERAGE LAYS: CATEGORY 2 OCCUPATIONS
(All Grounds and Single Occupation Only)
New BedrordVessels, 1840.58, 1866
YEAR4Th MATE SHIP MISC. BLACKSMITHS MISC. MISC. BOYS
KEEPER SKILLED ARTISANS2 SERVICE3
SEAMEN1
1840 82.5 113.3 146.2 151.7 223.8
1841 75.9 90.0 100.0 156.3 155.0 313.4
1842 73.1 117.0 11.0 158.1 148.8 227.7
1843 74.0 121.3 98.3 163.1 159.2 404.2
1844 73.1 125.0 72.5 158.6 166.2 531.8
1845 78.1 105.0 175.0 163.8. 632.6
1846 76.8 119.0 164.2 181.0 909.7
1847 73.2 135.0 165.4 171.4 499.7
1848 75.3 112.5 171.7 175.7 368.6
1849 68.0 111.7 167.2 160.5 255.9
1850 70.6 133.3 75.0 175.3 161.8 335.1
1851 73.1 100.0 120.0 176.9 175.2 175.0 538.8
1852 70.1 126.2 178.2 168.8 603.3
1853 72.5 160.0 55.0 177.2 185.0 477.5
1854 70.8 116.4 145.0 171.6 171.9 252.3
1855 67.5 92.5 90.0 182.2 155.0 249.3
1856 64.0 108.0 181.9 180.6 180.0 475.1
1857 67.7 110.0 179.2 177.5 471.5
1858 70.2 115.0 162.5 184.8 190.0 250.5
1866 68.8 96.7 175.0 193.7 224.0 282.0
AVG. 72.3 115.4 109.4 171.3 171.2 177.5 415.1
Misc. Skilled Seamen includes: 5th Mate, 2nd Boatsteerer, Preventive Boatsteerer, Extra PreparedBoatsteerer,Head-a-Boat,
AssL Boat Steerer, and Navigator.
2.Misc. Artisan includes: 2nd Cooper, 2nd Carpenter, Sailmaker, Boat Builder, 2nd Blacksmith, Painter, Surgeon Doctor,
Mechanic, Machinist, Caulker, and Coppersmith.
3.Misc. Service includes: Steerage Steward, 2nd Steward, 2nd Cook, and Steerage Master.
Sources: see text.58
TABLE 4
AVERAGE LAYS: ALL YEARS BY OCCUPATION,
New BedfordVoyages, 1840-58,1866
(ALLGROUNDS)
OCCUPATION AVERAGE PERCENT OF RELATIVE SHARES:% CHANGE IN LAY
LAY VALUE UNSKILLED SEAMEN 1840-43 TO
OF CATCH EQUAL 100 1855-58
CAPTAIN 15.2 6.58 1219 -17.3
FIRST MATES 23.2 4.31 799 -24.1
SECOND MATES 38.4 2.60 483 -21.7
THIRD MATES 53.9 1.86 344 -19.2
FOURTH MATES 72.3 1.38 256 -11.8
BOAT5TEERR5 87.4 1.14 212 -1.1
SHIPKEEPERS 115.4 0.87 161 -3.6
MISC. SKILLED
MARITIME 109.4 0.91 169 22.8
COOPERS 57.2 1.75 324 -8.1
CARPENTERS 163.9 0.61 113 13.8
BLACKSMITHS 171.3 0.58 108 16.7
MISC. ARTISANS 171.2 0.58 108 14.4
COOKS 140.3 0.71 132 3.4
STEWARDS 135.9 0.74 136 0
SKILLED SEAMEN 150.9 0.66 123 14.7
SEMI SKILLED SEAMEN 166.8 0.60 111 8.7
UNSKILLED SEAMEN 185.3 034 100 8.7
BOYS 415.1 0.24 45 33.5
Sources: see text.TABLES
RELATIVE LAYS BY GROUND, ALL YEARS
New Bedford Voyages, 1840-58, 1866
(Atlantic =100)
GROUND
OCCUPATION ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC W. ARCTIC
OFFICERS
CAPTAINS 100 104 107 106
FIRSTMATES 100 109 114 106
SECOND MATES 100 109 114 109
THIRD MATES 100 104 107 101
SKILLED MAR 1TIME
BOATSTEERERS 100 116 126 127
ARTISANS
COOPERS 100 95 97 97
CARPENTERS 100 112 114 116
SERVICE PERSONNEL
COOKS 100 109 112 116
STEWARDS 100 103 107 107
SEAMEN
SKILLEDSEAMEN 100 111 117 122
SEMI-SKILLED SEAMEN 100 107 113 117
IJNSKILLEDSEAMEN 100 113 119 123
SIMPLE AVERAGE ALL OCCS. 100 108 112 112
Sources: see text.
59TABLE 6
RELATIVE LAYS BY GROUND
New Bedford Vessels, 1849-58, 1866
(Atlantic =100)
GROUND
OCCUPATION ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC ARCTIC
OFFICERS
CAPTAINS 100 102 106 107
FIRSTMATES 100 107 113 112
SECOND MATES 100 111 116 118
THIRD MATES 100 102 105 105
SICILLfl) MARmME
BOATSTEERERS 100 115 127 130
ARTISANS
COOPERS 100 94 95 97
CARPENTERS 100 107 112 iii
SERVICE PERSONNEL
COOKS 100 107 111 114
STEWARDS 100 107 110 113
SEAMEN
SKILLED5EAMjJ 100 109 116 119
SEMI-SIaLEDSEA&JVIEN 100 107 112 115
UNSKILLED SEAMEN 100 112 120 122




MONThLY EARNINGS, BY OCCUPATION, ALL GROUNDS, OWN VESSEL
CURRENT PRICES
NEW BEDFORD VESSELS, 1840-58, 1866
PANEL A
YEAR CAPTAINS FIRST MATES SECOND MATES THIRD MATES BOATSTEERERS COOPERS
1840 92.51 54.89 33.05 24.71 17.61 26.77
1841 71.38 45.45 29.18 21.12 14.35 22.52
1842 78.15 Si.00 30.98 23.14 16.20 23.75
1843 81.55 50.54 30.98 21.87 15.05 22.56
1844 70.00 42.94 27.71 18.70 13.32 18.90
1845 66.95 42.77 26.09 20.13 12.70 21.08
1846 83.81 53.37 32.81 24.79 15.90 23.60
1847 83.08 50.58 31.88 23.70 15.72 24.14
1848 110.10 69.84 44.91 29.62 19.70 33.00
1849 104.72 68.48 41.71 28.30 19.81 30.11
1850 109.02 73.74 44.35 29.09 18.78 32.94
1851 116.66 79.40 45.82 32.42 19.64 32.79
1852 107.66 73.56 42.00 31.87 18.60 28.82
1853 123.53 85.29 48.49 35.74 21.45 34.51
1854 111.26 77.70 45.21 32.51 19.83 29.94
1855 100.51 68.52 40.08 28.79 16.34 26.37
1856 106.98 72.19 41.16 29.52 16.82 28.09
1857 93.04 65.06 38.65 26.21 14.25 22.08
1858 104.35 69.73 41.77 27.30 16.87 27.07
1866 137.55 87.95 57.30 37.14 22.22 31.39
AVG. 97.64 64.15 38.71 27.33 17.26 27.02
The estimate assumes the crewman returned on the vessel on whichhesailed.62
PANEL B
YEAR CARPENTERS COOKS STEWARDS SKILLED SEMI-SKILLED UNSKILLED
SEAMEN SEAMEN SEAMEN
1840 10.41 10.86 11.29 10.84 9.55 8.90
1841 7.95 8.88 9.25 8.52 8.11 6.90
1842 7.86 9.64 9.69 9.57 8.43 7.60
1843 8.80 9.17 9.74 9.04 834 7.71
1844 7.12 7.91 8.24 7.69 7.30 6.25
1845 7.02 7.72 7.69 7.72 5.84 6.27
1846 8.00 9.78 9.90 9.81 8.45 7.57
1847 7.86 9.49 9.90 8.76 8.08 7.51
1848 11.28 12.44 12.39 12.60 10.13 9.50
1849 11.51 12.26 12.04 11.35 1046 9.08
1850 10.07 11.50 1154 1139 9.24
1851 10.50 11.90 12.62 10.85 941 920
1852 9.53 11.02 13.72 1146 8.58 8.44
1853 12.49 13.01 14.30 10.77 10.72 9.80
1854 10.36 11.45 12.71 12.76 8.71 8.76
1855 8.92 9.34 11.19 933 8.54 7.37
1856 8.41 9.88 10.77 9.67 7.87 7.33
1857 7.40 9.03 9.59 7.52 7.28 6.58
1858 9.00 9.82 10.40 8.63 9.58 7.41
1866 11.17 12.34 16.15 12.17 10.62 9.73
AVG. 9.28 10.37 11.16 10.03 8.76 8.03
Sources: see text.TABLES
COMPARATIVE WAGES:MERCHANTMEN AND WHALERS
CURRENT $'S PER MONTH', 1840-58, 1866
PANEL A
CAPTAINS FIRST MATES 2ND MATES
YEAR MM W W/MM MM W W/MM MM W W/MM
1840 30.0092.50 3.0826.0054.90 2.11 19.3333.00 1.71
1841 30.0071.40 2.38213345.50 2.13
1842 30.00 78.16 2.6121.0051.00 2.43 4.0030.00 7.50
1843 30.0081.60 2.72 18.6750.50 2.71
1844 27.5070.00 2.55 18.6742.90 2.30
1845 26.67 67.00 2.51 19.2542.80 2.22
1846 28.0083.80 2.99 20.3353.40 2.63 19.0032.80 1.73
1847 25.0083.10 3.3231.0050.60 1.63 21.0031.90 1.52
1848 30.00110.10 3.67 22.0069.80 3.17 20.0044.90 2.25
1849 30.0068.50 2.28
1850 27.33109.00 3.99173073.70 4.21
1851 32.0079.40 2.4820.0045.80 2.29
1852 28.0073.60 2.6320.0042.00 2.10
1853 35.00142.60 4.07 25.67100.003.9020.0056.20 2.81
1854 35.00109.40 3.1346.2576.40 1.65333344.50 1.34
1855 37.5040.00 1.07
1856
1857 50.0069.70 1.39 35.0039.00 1.11
1866 55.0088.80 1.61 36.0057.80 1.61
AVG.29.54 91.55 3.09 28.3964.21 2.44 23.7641.49 2.25
NOTES: WHALERS ARE NEW BEDFORD "OWN VESSEL", ALL GROUNDS




COOKS SKILLED SEAMEN SEMI-SKILLED SEAMEN
YEAR MM W W/MM MM W W/MM MM W W/MM
1840 13.7510.900.79 14.0010.80 0.77
1841 9.808.90 0.91 14.008.52 0.61
1842 10.009.60 0.96 13.009.570.74
1843 8.339.20 1.10 13.0010.11 0.78
1844 8.437.90 0.94 14.007.70 0.55
1845 11.177.60 0.68 14.007.70 0.55
1846 12.369.80 0.79 14.009.80 0.70 8.60 8.50 0.99
1847 20.009.50 0.48 14.008.80 0.63
1848 12.1712.40 1.02 15.0012.60 0.84 10.2510.10 0.98
1849 15.0012.30 0.82 15.0011.40 0.76
1850 13.0011.500.88 13.0011.60 0.89
1851 16.5011.900.72 15.0010.90 0.73 9.63 9.40 0.98
1852 17.2511.000.64 15.0011.50 0.77 9.53 8.60 0.90
1853 15.0015.00 1.00 15.0018.10 1.21 12.281030 0.87
1854 27.0011.200.41 15.0012.50 0.83 9.78 8.50 0.87
1855 26.009.300.36 15.009.30 0.62 8.49 8.50 1.00
1856 9.67
1857 25.009.100.36 15.007.58 0.51
1858 8.00
1866 29.3312.50 0.4327.0012.20 0.45 13.0310.30 0.79
AVG. 16.1210.53 0.74 15.0010.42 0.72 10.20 9.33 0.92
Sources:see text.
64TABLE 9




MONTHLY MONTHLY NOMINAL WAGES INCLUDING BOARD
NOMINAL WAGES ARE OWN VESSEL AND ALL GROUND
WAGES
YEAR ARTISANS CAPTAINS1 MATES 2 MATES 3 MATES STEERERS COOPERS
NORTHEAST
1840 37.50 99.29 61.67 39.83 31.49 24.39 33.55
1841 37.50 77.48 51.55 35.28 27.22 20.45 28.62
1842 34.25 83.63 56.48 36.46 28.62 21.68 29.23
1843 36.50 86.70 55.69 36.13 27.02 20.20 27.71
1844 32.50 75.00 47.94 32.71 23.70 18.32 23.90
1845 38.75 72.06 47.88 3110 2524 17.81 26.19
1846 37.25 88.89 58.45 37.89 29.87 20.98 28.68
1847 38.00 89.26 56.76 38.06 29.88 21.90 30.32
1848 35.75 115.78 75.52 50.59 35.30 25.38 38.68
1849 36.00 110.42 74.18 47.41 34.00 25.51 35.81
1850 36.25 114.56 79.28 49.89 34.63 24.32 38.48
1851 35.75 122.19 84.93 51.35 37.95 25.17 38.32
1852 37.00 113.76 79.66 48.10 37.97 24.70 34.92
1853 38.25 129.84 91.60 54.80 42.05 27.76 40.82
1854 41.00 118.62 85.06 52.57 39.87 27.19 37.30
1855 43.25 108.34 76.35 47.91 36.62 24.17 34.20
1856 48.25 114.34 79.55 48.52 36.88 24.18 35.45
1857 100.84 72.86 46.45 34.01 22.05 29.88
1858 110.64 76.02 48.06 33.59 23.16 33.36
1866 149.11 99.51 68.86 48.70 33.78 42.95
AVG.
1840-56 37.87 101.19 68.39 43.45 32.84 23.18 33.07
ALL YRS 104.04 70.55 45.10 33.73 23.65 33.42
M-V refersto theMaigo-Villaflor Series




NOMINAL WAGES ARE OWN VESSEL
WAGES AND ALL GROUND
YEAR ARTISANS CARPENTER COOKS STEWARDS
NORTHEAST
1840 37.50 17.19 17.64 18.07
1841 37.50 14.05 14.98 15.35
1842 34.25 13.34 15.12 15.17
1843 36.50 13.95 14.32 14.89
1844 32.50 12.12 12.91 13.24
1845 38.75 12.13 12.83 12.8O
1846 37.25 13.08 14.86 14.98
1847 38.00 14.04 15.67 16.08
1848 35.75 16.96 18.12 18.07
1849 36.00 17.21 17.96 17.74
1850 36.25 15.61 17.04 17.08
1851 35.75 16.03 17.43 18.15
1852 37.00 15.63 17.12 19.82
1853 38.25 18.80 19.32 20.61
1854 41.00 17.72 18.81 20.07
1855 43.25 16.75 17.17 19.02
1856 48.25 15.77 17.24 18.13
1857 15.20 16.83 17.39
1858 15.29 16.11 16.69
1866 22.73 23.90 27.71
AVERAGES:
1840-56 37.87 15.32 16.38 17.02
ALL YRS 15.68 16.77 17.55
6667
PANEL C
NOMINAL MONTHLY WAGES NOMINAL MONTHLY WAGES
INCLUDING BOARD
WAGES ARE OWN VESSEL
AND ALL GROUND
M-V UNSKILLED ALL SEMI-
UNSKILLED MASS. FACTORY URBAN SKILLED SKILLED UNSKTLLEI)
YEAR NORTHEAST TEXTILESWORKERS UNSKILLED SEAMEN SEAMEN SEAMEN
1840 37.50 14.63 16.00 23.74 17.62 16.33 15.68
1841 37.50 14.59 15.75 22.74 14.62 14.21 13.00
1842 35.25 14.81 17.25 21.50 15.05 13.91 13.08
1843 36.50 13.94 16.25 19.75 14.19 13.49 12.86
1844 32.50 14.67 16.00 20.75 12.69 12.30 11.25
1845 38.75 15.09 15.50 21.24 12.83 10.95 11.38
1846 37.25 15.27 19.00 22.74 14.89 13.53 12.65
1847 38.00 15.73 16.88 22.74 14.94 14.26 13.69
1848 35.75 16.15 17.50 22.25 18.28 15.81 15.18
1849 36.00 15.86 18.75 23.25 17.05 16.16 14.78
1850 36.25 16.22 20.00 22.74 17.13 14.78 14.30
1851 35.75 15.95 18.75 22.38 16.38 14.94 14.73
1852 37.00 15.66 18.88 22.74 17.56 14.68 14.54
1853 38.25 15.68 19.25 23.74 17.08 17.03 16.11
1854 41.00 16.06 19.50 25.49 20.12 16.07 16.12
1855 43.25 16.08 19.75 25.00 17.16 16.37 15.20
1856 48.25 16.26 21.25 25.49 17.03 15.23 14.69
1857 15.89 21.25 25.26 15.32 15.08 14.38
1858 14.48 20.38 25.25 14.92 15.87 13.70
1866 27.06 33.50 40.53 23.73 22.18 21.29
AVG.:
1840-56 37.87 15.45 18.02 22.84 16.15 14.71 14.07
ALL YRS 16.00 19.07 23.97 16.43 15.16 14.43
Sources:see text.68
TABLE10




YEARCAPT. MATE 1MATE 2 MATE 3STEERERCOOPER CARP'TR COOK STEWARD
1840 265 164 106 84 65 89 46 47 48
1841 207 137 94 73 55 76 37 40 41
1842 244 165 106 84 63 85 39 44 44
1843 238 153 99 74 55 76 38 39 41
1844 231 148 101 73 56 74 37 40 41
1845 186 124 81 65 46 68 31 33 33
1846 239 157 102 80 56 77 35 40 40
1847 235 149 100 79 58 80 37 41 42
1848 324 211 142 99 71 108 47 51 51
1849 307 206 132 94 71 99 48 50 49
1850 316 219 138 96 67 106 43 47 47
1851 342 238 144 106 70 107 45 49 51
1852 307 215 130 103 67 94 42 46 54
1853 339 239 143 110 73 107 49 50 54
1854 289 207 128 97 66 91 43 46 49
1855 251 177 Iii 85 •56 79 39 40 44
1856 237 165 101 76 50 73 33 36 38
AVG. 268 181 115 87 61 88 41 43 45
RATIO OF RELATIVEEARNINGS;1840-43 TO 1853-56
RATIO 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.9469
PANEL B
SKILLED SEAMEN TO: SEMI-SKILLED SEAMEN TO:
M-V ALL M-V ALL
UNSKLD MASS.UNSKLD URBAN UNSKLD MASS. UNSKLD URBAN
YEAR NO'EAST TEXTILE FACTORY UNSKLDNO'EAST TEXTILE FACTORY UNSKLD
1840 47 120 110 74 44 112 102 69
1841 39 100 93 64 38 97 90 62
1842 44 102 87 70 41 94 81 65
1843 39 102 87 72 37 97 83 68
1844 39 87 79 61 38 84 77 59
1845 33 85 83 60 28 73 71 52
1846 40 98 78 65 36 89 71 60
1847 39 95 89 66 38 91 84 63
1848 51 113 104 82 44 98 90 71
1849 47 108 91 73 45 102 86 70
1850 47 106 86 75 41 91 74 65
1851 46 103 87 73 42 94 80 67
1852 47 112 93 77 40 94 78 65
1853 45 109 89 72 45 109 88 72
1854 49 125 103 79 39 100 82 63
1855 40 107 87 69 38 102 83 65
1856 35 105 80 67 32 94 72 60
1857 96 72 61 95 71 60
1858 103 73 59 110 78 63
1866 88 71 59 82 66 55
AVG.
1840-56 43 104 90 71 39 95 82 64
ALLYRS 103 87 69 95 80 64
RATIO OF RELATIVE WAGES: (1) 184043 TO 1853-56 & (2)184043 TO 1855-58
(1):
(2): 1.03 1.21 1.10 1.00 1.17 1.07
whaling wages are all groundPANEL C
UNSKILLED SEAMEN TO:
M-V ALL
UNSKLD MASS. UNSKLD URBAN
YEAR NO'EAST mxFAC'RY UNSKLD
1840 42 107 98 66
1841 35 89 83 57
1842 38 88 76 61
1843 35 92 79 65
1844 35 77 70 54
1845 29 75 73 54
1846 34 83 67 56
1847 36 87 81 60
1848 42 94 87 68
1849 41 93 79 64
1850 39 88 71 63
1851 41 92 79 66
1852 39 93 77 64
1853 42 103 84 68
1854 39 100 83 63
1855 35 95 77 61
1856 30 90 69 58
1857 91 68 57
1858 95 67 54
1866 79 64 53
AVG. 37 91 78 62
1840-56 91 77 61
ALL YRS
RATIO OF RELATIVE WAGES: (1) 1840-43 TO 1853-56 &
(2)1840-43TO 1
(1): 1.02 0.97 1.07 1.00
(2): 1.02 1.19 1.09
Sources: see text.
70TABLE 11
CHANGE IN WAGES 1840.43 TO 1855-58, BY OCCUPATION
NOMINAL W-P REALW-L REALD-S REAL
OCCUPATIONS DOLLARSDOLLARS
1. CAPTAINS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 25.1 3.5 -1.8 6.6
1840.43 TO 1847-51 25.8 11.7 9.2 23.6
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -0.5 -8.3 -10.0 -11.9
2. FIRST MATES
1840-43 TO 1855-58 36.5 11.9 7.2 16.4
1840-43 TO 1847-51 30.1 15.3 12.7 28.8
1847-51 TO 1855-58 4.9 -3.0 -4.9 -7.1
3. SECOND MATES
1840-43 TO 1855-58 30.2 6.7 2.2 10.9
1840-43 TO 1847-51 31.1 16.4 13.8 29.1
1847-5 1 TO 1855-58 -0.7 -8.4 -10.2 -12.1
4. THIRD MATES
1840-43 TO 1855-58 23.1 0.9 -3.3 5.1
1840-43 TO 1847-51 21.9 8.3 5.9 19.9
1847-51 TO 1855-58 1.0 -6.8 -8.6 -10.3
5. BOATSTEERERS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 1.7 -16.9 -20.2 -13.4
184043 TO 1847-51 17.1 4.1 1.7 16.1
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -13.2 -20.1 -21.5 -23.1
6. COOPERS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 8.4 -11.5 -15.0 -7.6
1840-43 TO 1847-51 25.7 11.5 9.1 22.5
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -13.8 -20.6 -22.1 -23.6
7. CARPENTERS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 -3.7 -21.3 -24.4 -18.0
1840-43 TO 1847-51 16.3 3.4 1.0 11.6
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -17.2 -23.8 -25.1 -26.7
8. COOKS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 -1.3 -19.2 -22.5 -15.9
1840-43 TO 1847-51 18.5 5.4 3.0 16.3
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -16.7 -23.3 -24.7 -26.2
9. STEWARDS
1840-43 TO 1855-58 5.0 -14.0 -17.5 -10.4
1840-43 TO 1847-51 14.8 2.1 -0.2 11.6
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -8.6 -15.8 -17.3 -18.8
10. SKILLED SEAMEN
1840-43 TO 1855-58 -7.4 -24.2 -27.2 -20.9
1840-43 TO 1847-51 16.7 3.6 1.4 15.4
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -20.7 -26.9 -28.2 -29.5
11. SEMI-SKILLED SEAMEN
1840-43 TO 1855-58 -3.4 -21.2 -24.3 -18.1
1840-43 TO 1847-51 10.1 -2.0 -4.3 6.9
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -12.2 -19.5 -20.9 -22.7
12. UNSKILLED SEAMEN
1840-43 TO 1855-58 -7.8 -24.5 -27.6 -21.4
1840-43 TO 1847-51 12.0 -0.3 -2.6 10.3
1847-51 TO 1855-58 -17.7 -24.3 -25.7 -27.1
W-P= Warren-Pearson, W-C=Williamson-Lindert, P-S= David- Solar
Sources: see text.
71TABLE 12
RELATIVE MONTHLY WAGES BY GROUND
NEW BEDFORD VESSELS, 1840-58, 1866
(ATLANTIC =100)
OCCUPATION ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC W. ARCTIC
CAPTAIN 100 98 111 134
FIRSTMATE 100 91 103 131
SECOND MATE 100 90 102 128
THIRD MATE 100 107 119 143
BOATSTEERER 100 88 92 108
COOPER 100 104 113 132
CARPENTER 100 65 74 86
COOK 100 97 108 129
STEWARD 100 74 82 102
SKILLED SEAMAN 100 72 82 93
SEMI-SKILLED SEAMAN 100 110 113 133
UNSKILLED SEAMAN 100 99 89 114
AVERAGEALLOCCXJPATIONS 100 91 99 119






Non Physical Risk Adjusted
(Dependent Variable is
expected monthly wage


















Intercept +10.237 * +11.038 *
Time +.0847 * ÷.0538 *
Financial Risk +.00247 * +.00230 *
(Voyage Length)2 -.00348 * -.00383 *















CREW&VOYAGE CHARACTERISTICS, ALL GROUNDS
NEW BEDFORD VESSELS, 1840-58. 1866
----FRACTION ----RELATIVES: 1840 =1000----
----FRACTION----
--IN CREW-- AMONGSEAMEN --IN CREW-- AMONG SEAMEN
Produc- Pmduc-
tivity Who Who Who tivity Who Who Who
Index Are Are Are Index Are Are Are
Year flilterate Unskilled Unskilled Illiterate Unskilled Unskilled
1840 0.976 0.211 0.292 0328 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1841 0.914 0.192 0.308 0.565 0.9360.910 1.055 1.070
1842 1.1010201 0.324 0.607 1.1280.953 1.110 1.150
1843 0.9240.190 0.292 0.546 0.9470.900 1.000 1.034
1844 0.8990.220 0335 0.631 0.921 1.043 1.147 1.195
1845 0.8180.217 0.355 0.660 0.838 1.028 1.216 1.250
1846 0.8740.226 0.354 0.661 0.895 1.071 1.212 1.252
1847 0.7160.236 0.355 0.658 0.734 1.118 1.216 1.246
1848 0.9160.253 0.343 0.654 0.939 1.199 1.175 1.239
1849 0.7890.235 0.360 0.674 0.808 1.114 1.233 1.277
1850 0.8640.233 0387 0.725 0.885 1.104 1.325 1.373
1851 0.6980.235 0390 0.710 0.715 1.114 1.336 1345
1852 0.4130.223 0.396 0.726 0.423 1.057 1.356 1.375
1853 0.6220.221 0.394 0.730 0.637 1.047 1.349 1.383
1854 0.6390.275 0.406 0.751 0.655 1.303 1.390 1.422
1855 0.5120.247 0.430 0.779 0.525 1.171 1.473 1.475
1856 0.603 0.265 0.426 0.773 0.6181.256 1.459 1.464
1857 0.6350.2800359 0.664 0.6511.327 1.229 1.258
1858 0.4160.238 0381 0.692 0.426 1.128 1305 1311
1866 0.5570.277 0.312 0.559 0.571 1.313 1.068 1.059
AVG. 0.744 0.234 0.360 0.665 0.763 1.108 1.233 1.259
AVERAGE (1)15 1840 TO 1843 AND AVERAGE (2)IS 1855 TO 1858
AVG.(1) 0.9790.199 0304 0.562 1.0030.941 1.041 1.063
AVG.(2) 0.5420.258 0.399 0.727 0355 1.220 1.366 1.377
PERCENT
CHANGE -0.4470.297 0.313 0.295 -0.4470.297 0.313 0.295
Sources: see (CXLTABLE 15a
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN NEW BEDFORD WHALING
Obs.: 2,343 voyages 991 voyages 991 voyages 991 voyages
F 103.1 64.7 62.2 59.4
AdJ.R2 .478 .562 .553 .565
Dep Mean .733 .690 .691 .691
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Pam Prob Pam Prob Pam Prob Pam Prob
Intercept 2.2 * 2.4 5 1.3 2.4*
Vessel type:






















Time -0.0004 0.002 -0.007 0.002
Bit for fit -0.30 0.03 0.04 0.02













Hunting Ground -0.004 -0.01 -0.02 5*-0.02
Technology 0.31
Vessel size 0.000002 0000002 0.000002 0.000002:
Voyage Length -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 • -0.0003
Vessel Age 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.004
Vessel Age Sq. -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00008
Last Voyage -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Real Common Wage:-0.006 -0.012 -0.013
Ratio, Skilled Wage
to Unskilled Wage -0.57 -0.27 -0.38
% illiterate 0.001 0.002












Measure Dummy -0.03 0.14 -0.11 0.17
Notes: : significant at the1% level
•:significant at the 5% level
:significantatthe10% levelTABLE ISh 76
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN NEW BEDFORD WHALING
Ohs.: 2,343 voyages 991 voyages 991 voyages 991voyages
F 103.1 61.9 59.3 57.1
Ad]. R2 .478 .563 .553 566
Dep Mean .733 .691 .691 .691
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Pan Prob Pan Prob Pan Prob Pan Prob
Intercept 2.2 * 2.3 * 1.2* 2.3*
Vessel type:
ships vs. all other 0.11 * 0.07 0.07 0.07
Hunting Ground
Atlantic -0.15 * -0.41 * -0.36 * -0.41 *
Indian -0.06 * -0.13 -0.12 ** -0.13 **
W.Arctic 0.17 * 0.12 *** 0.09 0.13 **
Time -0.0004 0.0005 -0.008 0.00004
Blt for fit -0.30 0.03 0.04 0.02
Re-rigged 0.09 * -0.20 ***-0.19 -0.19
Whale stocks:
Baleen 0.11 * 0.05 0.004 0.04
Sperm 0.05 0.19 0.50 0.21
Crowding on
Hunting Ground -0.004 -0.01 -0.02 * -0.01 **
Technology 0.31 *
Vesselsize 0.000002 * 0.000002 * 0.000002 * 0.000002:*
Voyage Length -0.0003 * -0.0003 * -0.0003 * -0.0003 *
VesselAge 0.004 * 0.006 0.008 *** 0.005
Vessel Age Sq. -0.00009 * -0.0001 -0.0001 ***-0.00009
Last Voyage -0.08 * -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
Real Common Wage:-0.006 * -0.013 * -0.014 *
Ratio,Skilled Wage
to Unskilled Wage -0.57 * -0.31 -0.43
% Illiterate 0.002 0.002
% Unskilled 0.001 0.001 *
Spec:
in Baleens -0.095 * -0.048 -0.048 -0.047
in Sperms -0.70 * -0.75 * -0.74 * -0.74 *
Captain'sLay 3.17 1.75 3.49
Measure Dummy -0.03 0.14 -0.11 0.17
Notes: Ii:significantat the 1% level
significant at the 5%level
***;significantat the 10% level77
TABLE16
AVERAGE NUMBEROF CREWMEN PERVOYAGE, BY OCCUPATION
NEW BEDFORD VESSELS, 1840THRU1843VS.1855THRU1858
PROFESSIONALS SEMI- UN-
SKILLED TOTAL SKILLED SKILLED SKILLED TOTAL
YEAR OFFICERS MARITIME ARTISANS SERVICE PROF. SEAMEN SEAMEN SEAMEN BOYS UNKNOWN CREW
1840 4.00 3.60 1.87 1.93 11.40 3.13 3.80 8.20 0.80 0.07 27.40
1841 3.71 3.04 1.84 1.84 10.42 2.38 3.69 7.76 0.56 0.02 24.84
1842 3.59 3.00 1.91 1.91 10.52 2.74 2.55 8.55 0.52 0.14 25.02
1843 3.96 3.46 2.08 2.04 11.54 3.31 3.50 8.04 0.62 0.00 27.00
AVG. 3.80 3.19 1.93 1.93 10.86 2.83 3.28 8.13 0.58 0.06 25.73
1855 4.12 3.38 2.04 1.88 11.42 1.68 1.78 12.39 0.59 0.00 27.86
1856 4.21 3.47 1.88 2.05 11.60 1.82 1.59 12.44 0.70 0.01 28.16
1857 4.26 3.68 2.19 2.01 12.15 2.39 2.76 10.38 0.56 0.00 22.24
1858 4.16 3.60 1.70 2.00 11.46 1.60 3.20 10.98 0.68 0.00 27.92
AVG. 4.19 3.52 1.97 1.99 11.67 1.89 2.26 11.60 0.63 0.00 28.06
ClING. 0.39 0.33 0.04 0.06 0.82 -0.94 .1.02 3.47 0.04 .0.05 2.32
%CFLNG. 0.103 0.103 0.021 0.030 0.075 -0.331 -0.312 0.427 0.077 -0.933 0M90
Sources:see text.78
TABLE 17
SKILL COMPOSITION OF A TYPICAL CREW, NEW BEDFORD VESSELS
1840 THRU 1843 VS. 1855 THRU 1858
FRACTION OF CREWWHO ARE SEMI- UN- TOTAL
SKILLED TOTAL SKILLED SKILLED SKILLED ALL
YEAR OFFICERS MARITIME ARTISANS SERVICE PROR SEAMEN SEAMEN SEAMEN BOYS UNKNOWN CREW
1840 0.146 0.131 0.068 0.070 0.416 0.114 0.139 0.299 0.029 0.002 1.00)
1841 0.149 0.122 0M74 0.074 0.419 0.096 0.149 0.313 0.023 0(1)1 1.00)
1842 0.147 0.120 0.076 0.076 0.420 0.110 0.102 0.342 0.021 0.006 1.000
1843 0.147 0.128 0.077 0.076 0.427 0.123 0.130 0.298 0.023 0.000
AVG. 0.147 0.125 0.074 0.074 0.422 0.110 0.127 0.316 0.023 0.002 1.000
1855 0.148 0.121 0.73 0.67 0.410 0.060 0.064 0.445 0.021 0.000 1.000
1856 aiso 0.123 0.067 0.073 0.412 0.065 0.056 0.442 0.025 0.000
1857 0.151 0.130 0.076 0.071 0.430 0.085 0.098 0.367 0.020 0.000l,
1858 0.149 0.129 0.061 0.072 0.410 0.057 0,115 0.393 0.024 0.000 1.000
AVG. 0.150 0.126 0.069 0.071 0.416 0.067 0.080 0.414 0.022 0.X) 1.000
CHNG. 0.003 0.001 -0.005 .0.003 .0.0060.042 0.047 0.097 .0.000 .0.002 0.000
%CHNG. 0.020 0.008 -0.068 -0.041 .0.014 .0.0386 -0.369 0.308 .0.012 -0.939 0.000
Sources:see LCXLTABLE 18 79
LABOR'S SHARE OF THE NET VALUE OF THE CATCH, ALL GROUNDS
NEW BEDFORD VOYAGES, 1840-58, 1866
PERCENTAGE RELATIVES: 1840 =100-
AVERAGEMAXIMUM MINIMUM AVERAGE MAXIMUM MINIMUM
LABOR LABOR LABOR LABOR LABOR LABOR
YEAR SHARE SHARE SHARE SHARE SHARE SHARE
1840 0.309 0.340 0.281 1.000 1.000 1.000
1841 0.309 0.380 0.269 1.000 1.118 0.957
1842 0.315 0375 0.261 1.019 1.103 0.929
1843 0.317 0.359 0.287 1.026 1.056 1.021
1844 0.317 0.388 0.265 1.026 1.141 0.943
1845 0.320 0.372 0.283 1.036 1.094 1.007
1846 0.318 0.371 0.282 1.029 1.091 1.004
1847 0.317 0.363 0.270 1.026 1.068 0.961
1848 0.317 0.352 0.263 1.026 1.035 0.936
1849 0.318 0.363 0.278 1.029 1.068 0.989
1850 0.333 0.383 0.290 1.078 1.126 1.032
1851 0.344 0.423 0.287 1.113 1.244 1.021
1852 0.344 0.386 0.299 1.113 1.135 1.064
1853 0.345 0.422 0.286 1.117 1.241 1.018
1854 0.347 0.427 0.2% 1.123 1.256 1.053
1855 0.359 0.461 0.301 1.162 1.356 1.071
1856 0.362 0.433 0.309 1.172 1.274 1.100
1857 0.362 0.429 0.306 1.172 1.262 1.089
1858 0.350 0383 0.295 1.133 1.126 1.050
1866 0.344 0.383 0.282 1.113 1.126 1.004
AVERAGE 0.332 0390 0.285 1.076 1.146 1.012
MAXIMUM 0.362 0.461 0.309 1.172 1.356 1.100
MINIMUM 0.309 0.340 0.261 1.000 1.000 0.929
AVERAGE (1) IS 1840-1843 AND AVERAGE (2)IS 1855-1858
AVG. (1) 0.3 13 0364 0.275 1.011 1.069 0.977
AVG. (2) 0.358 0.427 0.303 1.159 1.254 1.077
%CHANGE 0.146 0.173 0.103 0.146 0.173 0.103
Sources:see text.80
APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE WAGE MEASURES
The wage estimates reported in Table 7 (Own Vessel) reflect the earnings that the
whaleman would have received from his lay share had he returned on the vessel on which he
departed. An alternative measure, Own Ground, is based on the avenge catch of all vessels sailing
to a particular ground in the year that the crewman put to sea, and it provides another measure of
realized expectations. Although orders were sometimes changed, most agents had chosen the
general area to be hunted before the crew was signed. Moreover, from the agent's point of view,
the Own Ground figure might be viewed as an estimate of the potential labor cost of a voyage.
While there is evidence to support the belief that New Bedford residents knew something
about the cunent productivity of each of the various grounds, to the extent that these wage
estimates can be viewed as relevant information for a antedecisions,the Own Vessel and the Own
Ground estimates implicitly assume that both agent and crewman were able to accurately assess the
potential future productivity of each ground. For agents, who appear to have been continually in
contact with their captains and with merchants throughout the world, this assumption may not
overly distort reality; but for crewmen that conclusion is much less obviously correct. In an
attempt to capture the infonnation that would have been available to a seaman (or to an agent)
before the 'signing,' a third estimate, Own Year, was calculated. It is based on the average catch of
vessels returning to New Bedford from the marked ground in the year the crewman sailed to that
ground. It appears reasonable to assume that this evidence must have formed a substantial part of
the basis for the expectations of crewmen and agents, and, therefore, a wage estimate based on it
may be the best a ante estimate available. The interground wage regressions reported in Table 13
are based on the Own Year estimates.APPENDIX TABLE IA
DESCRIPTIONOF DATA, NEWBEDFORD VESSELS
1840-58,1866
NUMBEROF VOYAGES
YEARALL GROUNDS ATLANTIC INDIAN PACIFIC W.ARCTIC MIXED
1840 15 2 2 11 0 0
1841 55 8 13 34 0 0
1842 58 8 25 25 0 0
1843 52 2 15 31 0 4
1844 70 1 22 42 0 5
1845 53 3 14 28 0 8
1846 59 2 15 35 0 7
1847 59 0 14 38 0 7
1848 56 1 8 43 0 4
1849 57 2 15 37 2 1
1850 67 2 5 41 18 1
1851 117 11 10 63 30 3
1852 63 8 8 38 8 1
1853 86 7 7 54 17 1
1854 84 6 12 44 20 2
1855 74 9 8 43 10 4
1856 73 4 5 44 12 8
1857 73 3 9 42 16 3
1858 50 3 6 28 12 1
1866 37 15 3 13 5 1
Average: 63 5 11 37 8 3






YEAR ALL GROUNDS ATLANTICINDIANPACIFIC W.ARCTIC MIXED
1840 413 48 60 305 0 0
1841 1428 182 329 917 0 0
1842 1520 175 664 681 0 0
1843 1476 58 409 903 0 106
1844 1958 29 560 1229 0 140
1845 1590 60 429 838 0 263
1846 1699 38 388 1076 0 197
1847 1715 0 365 1150 0 200
1848 1655 24 214 1289 0 128
1849 1601 52 403 1062 60 24
1850 1920 39 117 1206 535 23
1851 3558 264 278 1958 976 82
1852 1825 186 231 1144 241 23
1853 2548 164 180 1631 533 40
1854 2393 140 296 1275 623 59
1855 2251 252 232 1302 337 128
1856 2231 102 144 1388 380 217
1857 2219 77 269 1291 494 88
1858 1521 87 162 847 394 31
1866 1119 413 87 419 167 33
Avenge: 1832 120 291 1096 237 89
Total: 36640 2390 5817 21911 4740 1782
Sources: see text.
82APPENDIX TABLE1C
DESCRIPTIONOFDATA, NEW BEDFORD VESSELS,
1840-58,1866
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1840 47984 22596 45659 53023 33 20 28 36
1841 39640 19752 29733 48107 34 22 29 39
1842 35327 12015 36023 42090 29 16 25 37
1843 42487 36778 34435 47268 33 20 29 37
1844 38201 17713 30098 42809 35 29 30 38
1845 38089 14452 37310 41177 34 33 33 34
1846 46316 14824 36253 53764 34 19 35 36
1847 50145 38780 53928 39 39 39
1848 57930 58587 42690 60652 34 17 27 36
1849 53326 37124 46066 55849 60080 36 24 37 36 21 1850 56260 6160 38825 58323 62904 36 18 29 38 36 1851 61138 22028 55502 65952 71179 36 27 35 39 36
1852 58581 17569 66300 63813 69038 37 20 36 41 38
1853 67246 27058 30653 75633 69567 39 30 39 41 37
1854 55834 22897 40942 58953 66073 37 22 36 39 40
1855 54577 41330 49013 57150 69760 41 31 36 43 42 1856 55287 13434 51260 62693 58356 41 17 43 44 40 1857 53833 22077 39254 57611 61522 44 30 38 46 46
1858 67767 51534 38276 67892 89832 46 41 44 48 46
1866 65047 40229 57540 83514 85324 37 22 44 47 49
Sources:see text